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ABSTRACT
This study of the Second World War examines the tactics employed by the 80th
Infantry Division of the United States Army in the European Theater of Operations in
1944 and 1945. Early historiography portrays American units as brave but less
sophisticated than their German adversaries. However, recent scholarship praises
American combat capabilities. Drawing largely upon official Army records and firsthand
accounts from American soldiers, this thesis argues that the 80th Infantry Division
developed into a highly effective fighting force in the European Theater when it properly
employed the concept of combined arms (the coordination of infantry, artillery, and
armor) on the battlefront with some exceptions. This study uses three examples from the
80th Division’s combat record that show the importance of combined arms and the
sophistication of American fighting forces late in World War II: the closing of the Falaise
Pocket, the crossing of the Moselle River, and in the Battle of the Bulge.
This study fills a key historiographical gap in scholars’ understanding of the
capabilities of American military forces in World War II. High- and low-level studies
exist of armies and companies, but little analysis has been awarded to the divisions. It is
crucial to understand division level combat because changes in WWII doctrine, to include
the implementation of combined arms, were “codified, refined, and disseminated” at this
echelon of command.1 In the end, this work provides a more complete picture of the way
in which the United States Army fought the war against Hitler’s Wehrmacht.
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CHAPTER I – INTRODUCTION
This study of the Second World War examines the tactics employed by the 80th
Infantry Division (ID) of the United States Army in the European Theater of Operations
in 1944 and 1945. Early historiography portrays American units as brave but less
sophisticated than their German adversaries. However, recent scholarship praises
American combat capabilities with the realization that the United States Army did not
rely solely on material superiority in battle. Drawing largely upon official Army records
and firsthand accounts from American soldiers, this thesis argues that the 80th Infantry
Division was a highly effective fighting force in the European Theater when it properly
employed the concept of combined arms (the coordination of infantry, artillery, and
armor) on the battlefront with some exceptions. Furthermore, it argues that the Division
learned from its previous combat experiences, though not always on a linear trajectory,
when engaged in combat with the forces of Nazi Germany. This study uses three
examples from the 80th Division’s combat record to demonstrate this, highlighting the
importance of combined arms and the sophistication of American fighting forces late in
World War II: the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap and the closing of the Falaise Pocket,
the crossing of the Moselle River, and the Battle of the Bulge.
This thesis fills a key historiographical gap in scholars’ understanding of the
capabilities of American military forces in World War II. High- and low-level studies
exist of armies and companies, but little analysis has been awarded to the divisions. It is
crucial to understand division level combat because changes in American WWII doctrine,
to include the implementation of combined arms, were standardized at this echelon of
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command.2 In the end, this work provides a more complete picture of the way in which
the United States Army fought the war against Hitler’s Wehrmacht.
Many of the histories that concern themselves with the events on the battlefield
rather than the symbiotic relationship of combat and culture or society are narrative
accounts. While having merit, these works often lack the element of a historical
argument, which professional historians demand. However, there are several studies that
seek to determine the major factors that led to the success of the US Army in the
European war. This debate contains two schools of thought on the matter at hand. The
first group believes the Americans and their allies emerged victorious due to American
industrial might and material capabilities. These individuals argue the German
Wehrmacht was a superior army to that of the United States. The second holds that the
American fighting force was equal, if not superior to that of Nazi Germany and
succeeded because of their combat capabilities. Major contributors to each school of
thought are discussed in this introduction. Furthermore, this thesis seeks to intervene in
the discussion of this topic by examining the tactics used by an individual combat
division in order to determine if it adapted the lessons learned by other units in the Army,
as well as those gained from its own combat experiences, to improve its fighting
capabilities. The findings of this thesis indicate that the assertions of those who argue for
the relative efficiency of the United States Army stand up to criticism. Although the 80th
Infantry Division suffered growing pains during its early battles, its men and officers
were able to improve their combat effectiveness through lessons learned on the battlefield

2
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and spending time and effort on training their soldiers for future battles based on these
lessons.
Michael D. Doubler’s Closing With the Enemy is a crucially important work for
this project as this thesis borrows Doubler’s model.3 Closing With the Enemy argues that
the driving force behind the success of the US Army in the European Theater was its
ability to adapt its tactics. Doubler claims that the campaigns in North Africa and Sicily
served as proving grounds for the doctrine of the Army. More specifically, he argues that
the Army improved its ability to employ combined arms—the cooperation of different
branches of the US Army, like infantry, artillery, armor, and air power. By the time of the
invasion of Normandy, military leadership saw that changes to these tactics were in
order.
However, it should be noted that the Army learned further lessons after D-Day,
leading to further tactical and doctrinal changes on the battlefront. Closing With the
Enemy maintains these adaptations were possible because Army leadership organized
training sessions during periods in which soldiers were in reserve rather than on the front
lines. Although it was not the only factor which led to the Army’s success in Europe, its
ability to adapt and overcome the challenges it faced played a crucial role in the
improvement of American fighting capabilities.
Another work that praises the combat effectiveness of the United States Army is
Peter R. Mansoor’s The GI Offensive in Europe.4 Mansoor argues the US Army was a
capable fighting force that had only to learn from its mistakes in order to win the fight
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Michael D. Doubler, Closing With the Enemy: How GIs Fought the War in Europe, 1944-1945
(Lawrence, Kansas: University Press of Kansas, 1994).
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against the German Wehrmacht. Furthermore, this work claims that the Germans were a
superior military early in the war because they had been fighting in modern tactics for a
longer period of time. However, where Mansoor’s work differs from this thesis is in its
focus on infantry divisions alone, rather than their cooperation with other branches of the
US Army. Mansoor places great emphasis on the replacement system of the Army,
showing that, although it was an imperfect process, leadership was able to make the best
of a poor situation and properly train replacements for combat once they arrived in
Europe. The importance of The GI Offensive in Europe is that it advocates for the study
of combat divisions, as this thesis does, because “The division was the key level at which
these new procedures codified, refined, and disseminated.”5
Russell F. Weigley’s tome, Eisenhower’s Lieutenants is highly critical of the
fighting capabilities of the Army of the United States in the European Theater of
Operations.6 This work flatly concludes that the reason for the success of the US Army
was its material superiority over the forces of Nazi Germany. Furthermore, Weigly states,
“the German army remained qualitatively superior to the American army, formation for
formation, throughout far too many months of the American army’s greatest campaign.”7
Other historians disagree with this assertion, but Eisenhower’s Lieutenants stands as one
of the most damning accounts of the combat effectiveness of the US Army in World War
II. Wiegley’s work stands in stark contrast both to Doubler’s work and the central
argument of this thesis.

5
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In 1994, Keith E. Bonn published a book entitled When the Odds Were Even, in
which he directly challenges the idea that the German Wehrmacht was a more effective
fighting force than that of the United States.8 Bonn’s argument is that the only campaign
of the European war in which the support capabilities (i.e. supply) of the two armies were
the same was the engagement in the Vosges Mountains of France. In Bonn’s own words:
“it is necessary, for accurate appraisal of the relative combat proficiency of the German
and American armies in the ETO, to find a time and place when the odds were even.”9
This work concludes that in a situation in which neither side enjoyed a logistical
advantage, the United States Army was able to best its German enemy, suggesting
American combat units were superior to the Wehrmacht. Bonn’s work supports the
arguments made in this thesis: that American fighting forces could in fact face the
challenge presented by the Germany Army.
As can be seen, the majority of works concerning themselves with US Army
performance in the European Theater focus on levels of command above that of the
division. The exceptions to this rule, among the publications mentioned here, are Bonn’s
When the Odds Were Even and Mansoor’s The GI Offensive in Europe. For this reason, it
is necessary to conduct further research into tactical innovations by placing an individual
division under closer examination. In order to do so, this thesis borrows the model of
Doubler’s Closing With the Enemy to determine if its argument holds when searching the
records of one division rather than the entire US Army. In doing so, this project seeks to
fill a gap in the historiography between studies of the regimental level and below to that
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of the corps and above. Works that do so omit a close examination of divisional combat
units, an extremely important link in the chain of command where changes in combat
tactics were standardized.10 This thesis is one of the first works to examine an individual
infantry division in relation to the improvement of its combat capabilities in World War
II.
The most important archival collections for this study of the 80th Infantry Division
are housed at the United States Army Heritage and Education Center (USAHEC) located
at the Army War College in Carlisle, Pennsylvania. Within these archives are several
collections relating to the Blue Ridge Division during the Second World War. The most
useful of these are the Barbara B. Payne Collection of Oral Histories, the Edward F.
Naughton Papers, the Harold L. Rives Collection, and the 4th Armored Division Papers.11
While not every individual document of these collections is relevant to this project, each
offers a unique perspective on the 80th Infantry Division during World War II, and all
make a significant contribution to this work. Furthermore, this thesis makes use of the
books of Robert T. Murrell, historian and veteran of the 80th Division, which combine the
unit histories of the 80th as well as its component regiments.12 Each of these sources are
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extremely important in this study of the Blue Ridge Division and its ability to learn from
its past experiences and those of the rest of the US Army during World War II.
The Barbara B. Payne Collection of Oral Histories is just that: a collection of interviews
that Barbara Payne conducted with veterans of the Second World War. Unfortunately,
only one of these individuals served with the 80th Infantry Division. However, the soldier
who was with the Blue Ridgers, Technician 3rd Grade William W. Lamond, experienced
combat during the Battle of the Bulge.13 As this was one of the largest and most pivotal
battles of World War II in Europe, any and all testimonies from veterans who fought with
the 80th are extremely valuable sources. Lamond tells of his daily experiences during the
brutal winter of 1944 and offers insights into the tactics the Blue Ridge Division
employed against its German foes, providing further examples of the Division’s use of
combined arms in the European Theater.
Some of the most important aspects of the Edward F. Naughton Papers, the
Harold L. Rives Collection, and the 4th Armored Division Papers are the variety of unit
histories and firsthand accounts of the experiences of these combat units. For example,
housed within the Naughton Papers is a December 1944 combat narrative of the 905th
Field Artillery Battalion, a unit that spent a significant portion of the war in support of the
operations of the 80th.14 While it stands to reason that the histories of the 80th ID and its
component regiments are the cornerstone of this research, it is necessary to study the
combat records of associated units as well. Although such units are not actually infantry
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Barbara B. Payne Interview with William W. Lamond, 23 August 1995, Barbara B. Payne
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formations, as is the Blue Ridge Division, they were still part of the combined arms team
with the men of the 80th. Therefore, these sources diversify perspectives of the battlefront
by showing the experiences of armor and artillery units in addition to foot soldiers. In this
way, they illustrate how all the different elements of combined arms worked together
within the organization of the 80th Infantry Division and its affiliated units.
Robert Murrell, a veteran of the 80th Infantry Division, compiled all of the reports
pertaining to the Division and its component regiments (the 317th, 318th, and 319th
Infantry Regiments) in several books, making access to the daily operations of the Blue
Ridge Division significantly more accessible. These sources are crucial to this project
because they provide the narrative of events for the 80th’s war experience. From this
narrative comes much of the material that allows for an analysis of the Division’s fighting
capabilities. In addition to these reports, Murrell also published a collection of oral
histories in which soldiers of the Blue Ridge Division retold some of their combat stories,
many of which are relevant to the question of the 80th’s ability to employ combined
arms.15 These oral histories provide evidence of the tactics the Division used in a way
that is less detached than official Army reports which are, by nature, impersonal and
disconnected from individual experiences of combat.
Each chapter of this thesis serves as a case study to display the combined arms
capabilities of the 80th ID and its ability to learn lessons from its previous combat
experiences. Naturally, the first case study is the Division’s involvement in the Battle of
Argentan and the closing of the Falaise Gap in August 1944, as this was the Blue

15
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Ridgers’ first significant combat experience.16 The purpose of this chapter is to set the
stage for the rest of the thesis and to create a benchmark in order to measure the
improvements, or lack thereof, in the 80th’s time in the European Theater. While it is the
goal of each chapter of this thesis to avoid heavy use of certain sources at the expense of
others, there are times when significant use of some sources is virtually unavoidable. For
example, when presenting an account of the operations of the division which will later be
analyzed, sources such as operational histories are used as they provide a concise
retelling of events on the battlefield. Otherwise, the intent is for each chapter to draw
from a variety of different archival collections and other primary sources.
The case study for the third chapter is the Blue Ridge Division’s attempts to cross
the Moselle River in September 1944. One of the major obstacles the United States Army
encountered during the war in Europe was determining how effectively to traverse rivers
on its march towards Germany and ultimate victory over the Nazi forces.17 The 80th
Division was forced to cross these bodies of water on more than one occasion.18 Due to
the frequency with which American soldiers were forced to engage in river crossings, one
such example must be examined in this work. This chapter argues that, although the 80th
had experienced combat before it reached the waters of the Moselle River, its regiments
had not yet completely learned the importance of the use of combined arms. While the
men did eventually make it across to the eastern banks, they were forced to make more
than one attempt at crossing due, at least in part, to inadequate support from other

“317th-AntiTank Operations Northeast of Argentan in Closing of Argentan-Falaise Gap,” 317th
Infantry Regiment Reports,
http://www.80thdivision.com/MiscReports/317th_ATCo_Operations_NE_Argentan_17-20AUG44.pdf.
17
Doubler, Closing With the Enemy, Chapter 6, 157-191.
18
Murrell, Operational History: ETO 80th “Blue Ridge” Infantry Division.
16
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branches of combined arms. In addition, the chapter discusses the importance of combat
leadership as embodied through General Edmund W. Searby, who was killed in action
during the Moselle River campaign.
Finally, Chapter Four is a study of the Blue Ridge Division during the Battle of
the Bulge. Hitler’s last-ditch offensive in the Ardennes Forest was a pivotal battle in the
European Theater. After this engagement, the German Wehrmacht would never again go
on a major offensive against the Allied forces. Spanning from the 16th of December 1944
to January 25th 1945, this winter battle is a veritable goldmine of information concerning
the ability of the 80th Division to learn from its past and employ combined arms to fight
the Germans. Furthermore, this case study is unique because the Battle of the Bulge was,
at least early in the engagement, primarily a defensive operation for the United States
Army. In contrast, the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap and the crossing of the Moselle
were offensive in nature. Thus, a study of the 80th on the defensive is necessary for a
more complete understanding of the combat unit’s combined arms capabilities and
propensity to learn from prior experiences. This chapter argues that during the Battle of
the Bulge the Blue Ridge Division showed the ability to learn from previous combat
experiences and fought with much greater effectiveness than in their earlier engagements.
For example, the division began implementing close cooperation of their armor and
infantry units from the onset of battle; a practice not seen immediately at the Battle of
Argentan-Falaise Gap. One of the major factors leading to these changes in tactics were
the periods of time in which the division was placed in reserve status which were used for
training purposes.
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As the Battle of the Bulge was such a massive engagement that cannot be studied
in its entirety within the scope of this project, the final chapter contains examinations of a
selection of the 80th Division’s involvement; most notably its actions in relation to the
liberation of the 101st Airborne Division at Bastogne, Belgium. This final chapter will
show through examples of the combined arms fighting of the division, as well as changes
in casualty figures, that the Blue Ridgers had become a highly effective fighting force by
the time of the fighting in the Ardennes Forest.
Although the 80th Infantry Division was an imperfect combat unit, which did not
always improve on a linear path during the Second World War, it nonetheless made great
strides in its combat effectiveness by the winter of 1944-1945. By taking the lessons it
learned in previous engagements and applying them to their future battles—especially by
way of training when they were not under enemy fire—the Blue Ridgers show that their
unit supports the argument that American combat units did not rely solely on the
industrial might of the United States to defeat the German Wehrmacht during the Second
World War.
The 80th Division is the topic of this thesis for a variety of reasons. The first of
these is that this unit was representative of many other infantry divisions in the European
Theater in that it had not experienced battle before landing in Normandy in 1944. For this
reason, it did not have the experience of North Africa or the Italian Campaign to draw
upon to improve its combat effectiveness. The fact that the division had not before
experienced battle is the second reason the 80th was chosen. Finally, the Blue Ridgers
were studied for the author’s familial connections. To avoid the potential for bias, it
should be noted that one of the author’s great grandfathers was a veteran of the 80th
11

Infantry Division. However, it is the intent of this thesis is to study a unit’s improvements
rather than to study its heroes, so little reference is made to this individual veteran so as
to avoid partiality.
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CHAPTER II – “FIRST BLOOD VICTORY”: BLUE RIDGERS AT ARGENTAN AND
THE FALIASE GAP

Figure 3. A Gun Crew of the 80th19
“First blood” is a term often used to describe the belligerent side that makes the
first successful strike against its enemy. In the case of the 80th Infantry Division in the
Second World War, “first blood victory” came at the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap.20
Although some units in the Blue Ridge Division had seen some combat since their arrival
in Europe, this engagement was the first time the larger units within the Division,
especially at the regimental level, fought together in the Second World War. As one
report from the 317th Regiment’s anti tank company states,
As aforementioned, the 80th Division was new to combat. During the bewildering
moves leading up to the positions in which we now find the division, no serious
enemy resistance had been encountered. There had been numerous platoon sized
actions, small scale ambushes, blind night meeting engagements, and many
19

Tracy Dungan, Shuntus Gun Crew, 1944, 400x266 px, 80th Division Digital Archives Project
(80 DDAP), Photo Collections: Tracy Dungan Collection,
http://www.80thdivision.com/photos/Dungan/Dungan.html.
20
“317th Infantry Crushes Foe In Victories Drive Through France, Luxembourg, Germany,
Austria: Seal Gap At Argentan,” The Thundering Herd, September 26, 1945, 1.
th
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defended roadblocks had been knocked out. However, the division could in no
wise be said to be “veteran.”21

The Battle of Argentan-Faliase Gap was a jarring experience for the men of the
division who had never before seen combat. Major James Hayes and the men of the 317th
were stunned by the death of a sergeant in Hayes’s unit. He and the men then realized
what combat was really like and “that the flow of combat induced adrenaline did strange
things to the body.”22 Facing the enemy on a large scale for the first time, the men of the
80th Infantry Division had to find a way to cope with the realities of combat and learn
how to be an effective fighting force against the German Wehrmacht. The confrontation
at Argentan, and the closing of the Falaise Gap would be the first test of the Blue
Ridgers’ resolve and courage. While this thesis does not examine the Blue Ridge
Division’s combat experience primarily through the eyes of individual soldiers, some of
their stories must be examined as these soldiers’ experiences help stress the importance
of the events that occurred on European battlefields.
The most logical place to begin any study of a unit in an effort to trace its ability
to adapt to combat and improve its effectiveness is in its first major combat action. In
doing so, this chapter aims to create a benchmark, so to speak, by which later combat
action of the 80th Infantry Division will be measured. A unit’s first battle is a jarring
experience for many men who have never before seen combat. Would they freeze when
the bullets started to fly or rely on their training and fight back? Would they be able to
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operate as a single unit and win or struggle to find cohesion and be cut to pieces by
enemy fire? And would they be able to learn from their first military engagement and
improve their fighting capabilities in the future? None of these questions, especially the
last, can be answered without examining the 80th Infantry Division’s first time in combat.
Before analyzing the combat effectiveness of the Blue Ridgers, a brief summary
of the battle itself is in order. This examination of the engagement of Argentan and the
Falaise Pocket/Gap, as well as the subsequent chapters of this thesis, will follow a pattern
of analyzing the 80th Division’s performance at each respective battle after the brief
summary. Furthermore, this chapter also examines the doctrine of the United States
during earlier stages of the war in order to understand the state of Army tactics when the
Blue Ridge Division arrived in the European Theater. In doing so, the chapter continues
to show the level of effectiveness with which the 80th Infantry Division fought during its
first engagement in the European Theater of Operations.23
The Situation on the Front24
The Blue Ridge Division arrived in France on August 5, 1944, landing on Utah
Beach two months after the Allied invasion of Normandy on June 6, 1944.25 The United
States Army, as well as the forces of the British Empire, had bogged down in this region
of northern France after successfully gaining a foothold in Fortress Europe on D-Day.
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Having battled the terrain, most notably the infamous Norman hedgerows, which caused
significant delays for the Allied forces as they attempted to navigate these terrain
features, as well as Germans in strong defensive positions, the officers and enlisted men
under the command of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, Supreme Commander of the
Allied Forces in Europe, desperately needed a breakthrough. While the Americans fought
to push beyond the bocage and hedgerows, General Bernard Law Montgomery and the
British forces struggled just as mightily to take Caen, their primary objective upon
making landfall in France.26

Figure 4. The Western European Front, August 1944
The Germans, for their part, had great cause to defend their positions with all their
might. They were fully aware that an Allied victory in Normandy would significantly
increase their chances of defeat in the Second World War. American and British forces
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did enjoy some advantages over their Axis foes. The Allies surprised the Wehrmacht at
Normandy, the Germans were undersupplied in comparison to the armies of the Allied
nations, and the Third Reich was not as adept at replacing its casualties as the Americans
or British.27 This is not to say that German soldiers were not up to the task of fighting the
Allies. Historian Anthony Beevor claims, through the account of an American divisional
commander, that the Germans were making excellent use of the relatively little war
materiel at their disposal.28 While the industrial might and vast store of supplies available
to the United States Army and its British counterpart did play a significant role in
achieving victory in the war, this was not the determining factor in the defeat of the
German forces, as the subsequent chapters of this thesis will demonstrate.
The Allied advance needed a catalyst to maintain its momentum after the
breakthrough of the German lines of defense in Normandy. This would come through the
assault on Falaise and the closing of the Falaise Gap. As the British, Canadians, and the
1st Polish Armored Division fought their way towards Falaise, Hitler ordered his generals
to counterattack with panzers at Mortain. This attack was a significant blunder on the part
of Hitler that would put the German 7th Army and 5th Panzer Army in danger of
encirclement at Falaise. Even in the face of evidence showing the German dictator that
this attack would put his forces in danger, the Führer continued to order his commander,
Generalfeldmarschall Günther von Kluge, to press the ill-fated assault that failed in its
goal of cutting of Patton’s forces.29
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At this point of the war, truly displaying the traits of a dictator, Hitler
micromanaged his military leadership. In doing so, the Führer handcuffed his generals,
not allowing them to take the initiative on the battlefield. Historian Stephen E. Ambrose
asserts that this was not an unusual occurrence in stating,

Because of the jealousies and complexities of the German high command,
because Rommel disagreed with Rundstedt, because Hitler was contemptuous of
his generals and did not trust them to boot, the German command structure was a
hopeless muddle. Without going into the details of such chaos, it suffices to note
here that Hitler had retained personal control of the armored divisions. They could
not be used in a counterattack until he had personally satisfied himself that the
action was the real invasion.30

This tendency was so deeply ingrained in Hitler that it was a factor in preventing a crucial
armored strike with the potential to prevent the Allies from establishing a beachhead
during the Normandy landings from materializing.31 Clearly, the leader of the Nazi Party
had not learned from his past and continued this pattern in ordering the attack on Mortain.
Hitler simply did not trust his commanders successfully to carry out the war effort, and he
continued to micromanage the Wehrmacht.32
The Allies launched Operation Dragoon; the attempt to close the Gap and encircle
as many of the German forces as possible before they were allowed to escape the vicinity
of Falaise. However, the Gap was not properly closed because commanders of the AngloAmerican Alliance did not properly utilize the forces at their disposal, allowing some of
the German forces to escape.33 In this operation, the United States Army would employ
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the entirety of the 80th Infantry Division for the first time in World War II. Pursuant with
Field Order #6, the Division’s objective was to capture the town of Argentan. The capture
of this area would assist the rest of the Allied forces in closing the Falaise Gap.34 This
then was the situation in which the 80th Division found itself as it prepared to participate
in its first major battle.
The 80th at Argentan
In order to understand the combat effectiveness of the Blue Ridgers, there must first be an
understanding of the division’s actions on the front. Following this will be an analysis of
its performance in battle. This section of the chapter presents further context for the
actions of the 80th and its men, allowing for a much more complete analysis of the
combat capabilities of the division.
When the 80th Infantry Division began its operations at Argentan, the original
plan called for Combat Team (CT) 318 to bear the brunt of the load by operating as the
lone assault force in the initial attack.35 The 317th Infantry Regiment was in division
reserve with one battalion assigned to guard the flank of CT 318, while the 319th Infantry
Regiment was charged with defending the French town of Angers against German attacks
in an operation independent of the rest of the Blue Ridge Division.36 At this point in time,
the 319th Regiment was under the command of the XX Corps of the United States Army
and would rejoin the rest of the 80th Division at a later date.37 The Blue Ridgers’ mission
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was to capture the high ground just north of Argentan to facilitate taking the town itself.38
Gaining the high ground is a common objective in warfare. By controlling hills and other
elevated locations on the battlefield, a military force gains the tactical advantage. In
regards to combined arms and massed firepower, such terrain features are the ideal place
for an artillery forward observer to direct artillery strikes. Without controlling the high
ground in France, it would be significantly more difficult for the Blue Ridge Division to
effectively radio in the artillery strikes which are so crucial to massed firepower.
In direct support of the 318th Regiment was B Company of the 702d Tank
Battalion, the first of many testaments to the great importance of coordinating all three
branches of combined arms: infantry, armor, and artillery.39 For its artillery support, the
318th relied on the US Army’s 314th Field Artillery Battlion.40 As will be seen, CT 318
relied heavily on support from these units as it attempted to take and hold Argentan to
allow the Allied forces to close the Falaise Gap and encircle a significant portion of the
German Wehrmacht, thus dealing a harsh blow to its combat capabilities.
As can be expected of a combat unit facing its first serious engagement on the
battlefield, the Blue Ridgers were uncertain of themselves when they first encountered
live fire from the enemy. The commander of the 318th Infantry Regiment found he was
forced to resort to physical coercion, kicking some of his soldiers in order to motivate
them to fight.41 While it is without question that soldiers are expected to respond and
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defend themselves when facing their enemy, historically, soldiers struggle to move
toward gunfire, explosions, and the potential to be horribly maimed or killed. Historian
SLA Marshall found that relatively few American soldiers who fought in World War II
actually fired their weapons at enemy combatants. Indeed, he concluded in his close postcombat study of soldiers that no more than fifteen percent of American GIs used their
weapons in the conflict.42 The same appears to have proved true of the Blue Ridgers at
Argentan. While the main focus of this work is the ability of the 80th Infantry Division to
improve its use of combined arms and massed firepower, the ability of soldiers simply to
move forward and fight is also something that must improve during the course of a war.
Although Marshall’s work can be counted among some of the most influential concerning
themselves with World War II, it should be noted that his findings on the number of men
who actually fired their weapons in combat were fabricated.43 Nonetheless, this is an
instance in which soldiers of the 80th struggled to find the motivation to fight once they
arrived on the battlefield. Marshall’s book is still relevant as it points towards the
importance of effective combat leadership.44
In his famous WWII memoir, EB Sledge stated that “A man’s ability to depend
on his comrades and immediate leadership is absolutely necessary. I’m convinced that
our discipline, esprit de corps, and tough training were the ingredients that equipped me
to survive the ordeal physically and mentally…”45 Any improvement in the ability of the
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Blue Ridgers to act in the face of danger would come from the influence of their
leadership and comrades. The quality of leadership on the battlefield was of paramount
importance and is one of the most important determining factors of combat effectiveness.
Because other Allied units had experienced great difficulty in attacking Argentan
head on, the 80th Division opted to encircle the town. This encirclement would,
theoretically, allow the Blue Ridgers to take the small French community. Furthermore,
the 80th Division’s officers’ decision to encircle the town rather than engage in a head on
assault shows that these men had learned from previous experiences of the Army that
direct attacks had not produced the desired effects. In order to do so, the division would
have to capture the high ground north of Argentan. Designated Hills 213 and 244, these
terrain features were crucial to the division’s mission, as controlling the high ground was
and is commonly prized as a tactical advantage on the battlefield. The Army estimated
that the Germans numbered about 2,500 with 20 tanks in addition to their artillery and
machine guns. These enemy soldiers had the advantage of knowledge of the battlefield
terrain and the fact that they had seen combat before.46
The tanks advancing alongside the foot soldiers quickly experienced the horrors
and realities of combat. One of the tank platoons was moving towards Argentan when it
reached the end of a hedgerow and German artillery opened fire on them. All four tanks
in this platoon were eliminated by the Wehrmacht. Reports stated that the Germans used
the star painted on the side of the tanks as a target and that flags on the tanks’ antennae
gave away their positions when they were behind the hedgerow. As the other American

Tristan Rondeau, “Baptism by Fire in Argentan: The First Engagement of August 18-19, 1944,
Part 1,” Translated by Dennis Adams, Normandie, February 2013, 51-52,
http://www.80thdivision.com/pdfs/Argentan_1_TristanRondeau.pdf.
46

22

units advanced on Argentan, they met stiff resistance from their German adversaries, and
their assault ground to a halt on Highway N24-A, a French road near the community. It
was at this stage that the infantry realized they would need massed fire support in order to
take Argentan, and called upon the artillery units attached to the 80th. While the finer
details of this artillery support will be examined later in this chapter, suffice to say this
development swung the momentum in the favor of the attacking American forces,
allowing them to continue their advance. 47
Losses for the 318th Infantry Regiment were heavy on the first day of combat, a
testament to the previously completely inexperienced 80th Division. Meanwhile, the 317th
had been in reserve for the entirety of August 18th. On the second day of combat at
Argentan, the 318th continued to have difficulty in assaulting the town. Therefore,
General Horace McBride, commander of the 80th Division, decided to pull the 318th back
and send in the fresh troops of the 317th Infantry Regiment. Lieutenant Colonel Russell E.
Murray, one of the 317th’s battalion commanders, refused to advance along the same
avenue of attack as the retreating 318th. He knew his men’s morale could not withstand
seeing their defeated comrades and that his units would suffer similar setbacks if they use
the same attack scheme, showing a propensity to learn from the experiences of other units
in the 80th and improvise, adapt, and overcome to improve combat effectiveness.48
This new assault by the 317th Infantry Regiment unfortunately faced the same
problems that plagued their brethren in the 318th. Once again slowed to a crawl by
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German artillery fire, the Americans responded with their own large caliber weaponry.
However, the inexperienced artillerymen sent a barrage which fell short, leading to
casualties from friendly fire. The anti tank company of the 317th attempted to send
supporting fire of its own, but to no avail. As the light faded on the 19th of August 1944,
the 80th Infantry Division had not yet achieved its objective.49
During the night of August 19th, the Blue Ridgers consolidated their positions and
the attached artillery units moved to more favorable positions on the battlefield. True to
their status as a green combat division, two anti tank unit officers, motivated by fear or
inexperience, balked or failed in their mission when ordered to support formations of
infantrymen. However, at the urging of their commanding officer, Captain William J.
Koob, Jr., a conversation which, according to Tristan Rondeau was “short but full of
verve,”50 these young officers overcame their apprehension, and the 80th’s armor
component avoided one of the oldest problems of command: motivating men to fight in
the face of possible mutilation or death. Without Koob’s leadership abilities, these two
officers may have never carried out their missions at Argentan. The hours of darkness
offered a modest respite to both American and German soldiers. Each side experienced
nothing more than occasional artillery and small arms fire during the night.51
While the 80th did not receive significant enemy fire on the night of August 19th,
the armored units under the command of Captain Koob discovered they no longer had
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contact with the 2nd Battalion of the 317th Regiment. Fearing he had lost the foot soldiers
who would help defend his armored units, Koob sent a runner to find the misplaced
battalion, but this man was lost as well. As the various units of the division could not
maintain consistent communication with one another, leadership imposed radio silence
until the morning, ordering all units to remain in their current positions. As this example
shows, effective communication among military forces is of paramount importance to
success on the battlefield. If the 80th Division were to improve its fighting capabilities,
one of the most crucial challenges it would have to overcome was difficulties in
communication. With no reliable means of staying in contact with one another, officers
of the Blue Ridge Division had no interest in losing further units. However, orders from
General McBride would soon change, and the Blue Ridgers were once again on the
attack.52
During this attack, which began in the early hours of August 20th, divisional
artillery hammered the German positions in Argentan, decimating the town and terrifying
the remaining civilian populace who opted not to flee when the battle began. However,
the German forces had already begun to retreat, abandoning their positions in Argentan.
The Wehrmacht did continue to fight during their retreat, engaging in counter battery
operations. While the presence of the 80th Division certainly played a role in the German
retreat, it is possible that Wehrmacht forces were likely to fall back from the onset of
battle, potentially adding to the likelihood of the Blue Ridgers’ success at Argentan.
American forces finally occupied Hill 213 around 0800 on the 20th. Having achieved the
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objective of obtaining the high ground near Argentan, the Blue Ridgers now held the
advantage over the Germans at the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap.53
Though the Germans were in the process of evacuating Argentan, the fighting in
the vicinity of the French town had not yet come to a conclusion. American officers
rushed to organize the 317th Infantry Regiment and its attached armored units. There was
fierce fighting in an orchard near the town, and the Blue Ridgers took significant
casualties. A lack of sufficient support from armored units greatly contributed to this
problem. Again and again the Americans in the 317th struggled to find enough infantry
and armor units to support one another against German resistance, an assertion which the
next section of this chapter examines and analyzes in greater detail.54
Although the fighting in the orchard was fierce, the Americans were finally able
to drive the Germans out of this area with the help of tank destroyers of the 702nd Tank
Battalion. It was with this support from armored units that the men of the 80th
permanently controlled Hill 231. While the 317th Regiment struggled mightily to take
Argentan, other units of the Blue Ridge Division fought to guard the flanks of their
comrades against German attacks. Confusion abounded on the battlefield as the
uninitiated division faced its first combat experience. At one point in the battle, General
Edmund Searby, commander of the 80th’s artillery section, told his men to stop firing
because he believed their targets were actually British tanks. However, realizing his
mistake, he instructed his soldiers to continue their assault. Such confusion is endemic
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among men and units who have never before seen combat. Even the experienced General
Searby struggled to make sense of what was happening on the battlefield.55
It was around 1030 hours on the morning of the 20th of August that the 80th
Infantry Division finally entered Argentan. The Americans moved through the
community to flush out all remaining German resistance. The Blue Ridgers had finally
achieved the main objective of their first battle. In taking Argentan, the men had played
an integral role in closing the Falaise Gap.56
The Coordination of Infantry and Armor
Prior to the Second World War, officers in armored units were taught that tanks
should be used “in mass, employed in depth on a narrow front, and directed against weak
segments of the enemy’s line.”57 This doctrine arose from the experiences of the United
States Army on the Western Front of World War I as the Great War was the Army’s first
major conflict involving the use of modern artillery. When the Americans came to the
realization that these tactics were ineffective in the terrain of the North African and
Mediterranean Theaters, they began to use tanks as a support for infantry units. Rather
than employing their armored units independently of foot soldiers, as was standard
practice earlier in the war, the Army had learned their tanks were best utilized when
interspersed among infantry soldiers to offer mutual support. This was especially true of
tank battalions attached to various infantry units.58 Inevitably, there were growing pains
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in determining the most effective way to ensure the proper coordination of infantry and
tanks. This is to be expected from a combat force that had only employed tanks in one
major military engagement (WWI), and was only further compounded by the fact that
tanks and the doctrine of armor implementation was rudimentary at best during the First
World War. However, over time the doughboys ascertained the best way to have these
two branches of combined arms work together.59 If the Blue Ridge Division was to defeat
the Germans at Argentan and help close the Falaise Gap, it would need to ensure it
effectively combined infantry and armor in France. In order to do so, they were required
to take the lessons the US Army learned in North Africa and the Mediterranean Theater
to make the best and most efficient use of the weapons of war at their disposal.
One commander of Company E, 317th Infantry Regiment, Captain James Mullen,
recorded his observations in regards to how the textbook cooperation of infantrymen and
tankers worked in the field,
The problems which arise in infantry-tank coordination are largely confined to the
tank commander and the infantry platoon leader. There must be clearer
understanding of the capabilities and limitations of the tank by the infantryman
and a similar understanding by the tanker…The tank company usually attached to
the infantry regiment should be as much a part of the outfit as any rifle
company.60
Mullen also observed that tankers and infantrymen often had unrealistic expectations of
what the other could accomplish, leading each group to ask the other to perform tasks that
could actually be carried out with their own weapons and training.61 Mullen’s
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observations also point towards the importance of effective leadership on the battlefield.
If, as he asserts, most problems between infantry and tank units came from the
interactions between their officers, then quality leadership was the lynchpin of these
military formations. Further examination of the combat record of the Blue Ridge Division
will show whether or not the men of the 80th were able to take observations like these,
along with the other lessons they learned in the Battle of Argentan, to improve their
combat effectiveness against the Wehrmacht.
At the Battle of Argentan, the 80th Infantry Division experienced difficulty in
making the best use of its armored units.62 At this point in the war, the division had
learned from other units in the United States Army and knew that armor was most
effective when it was in direct support of infantry units, as evidenced by the symbiotic
relationship of tanks of the 702nd Tank Battalion and 318th Infantry Regiment at
Argentan.63 Unfortunately, General McBride did not completely learn from the lessons of
other combat units, and chose to send the tanks of this battalion into Argentan without
proper infantry support on the first day of the battle. Because these tanks were sent
without foot soldiers alongside them, they were dangerously exposed to German fire, and
all the tanks that advanced in this stage of the assault were destroyed by the Wehrmacht.64
At least one veteran of the division felt that McBride did not truly understand how
to command an infantry unit, as his previous experience with the Army was in the
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artillery branch.65 One can extend this assertion to apply to armored units as well.
McBride was not exempt from the requirement to learn from his experiences on the
battlefield. In fact, as the commander of the 80th Infantry Division, he was the individual
with the heaviest burden in this regard. If the Blue Ridge Division was to reach peak
combat effectiveness, its leadership needed to learn from instances such as this. Without
proper leadership, it is extremely difficult for an organization, especially military units, to
function cohesively.
As the face of a military unit, the commanding officer takes on great
responsibility, both to his or her soldiers and nation. Urban legend in the military says
that officers wear their rank on their shoulders because this symbolizes the weight and
responsibility of leadership resting upon those very same shoulders. Without proper
leadership, it is extremely difficult, if not impossible for any organization, let alone a
combat division, to achieve its mission. It was Horace McBride’s responsibility as the
commanding officer of the 80th Infantry Division to ensure there was a culture of
competency and commitment to success in the unit. Without this example from its
commander, the 80th would face great challenges in learning from its past and improving
its combat effectiveness.
Unit historian Robert Murrell argued that the 318th Regiment’s difficulties in its
initial attack on Argentan stemmed from a lack of adequate support from medium tanks
and anti tank weapons.66 While the 80th did have the experiences of other Army units
from which to learn how to properly coordinate its combined arms capabilities, it
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remained a combat unit which had never before seen military action on this scale. Both
officers and enlisted men of this division were in unfamiliar positions. Even those who
may have seen combat in the First World War were fighting in an entirely different
conflict, presumably at higher levels of command. For this reason, the individuals
comprising the Blue Ridge Division had simply never before been forced to coordinate
tanks and infantry in the face of live enemy fire in this type of highly mobile warfare. The
failure of the 318th Infantry Regiment due to this lack of combined arms coordination is
but one example which shows the 80th had much to learn if it was to succeed in Europe.
The plain fact that armor and infantry were working together, albeit not with the desired
effect, shows that the 80th’s leadership at least knew these units required a symbiotic
relationship for survival on the battlefield.67
Historian Fred S. Ludt and Colonel Ralph Pearson argued that the failure of the 1st
Battalion, 318th Infantry Regiment on the first day of the Battle of Argentan was due to a
failure to move adequate anti tank support into the proper position in the battlefield. The
reason for this difficulty was the presence of a river near the town of Argentan. While it
was unfortunate that this terrain feature stalled the advance of the division, it was
nonetheless one of the realities of warfare. The terrain of a battlefield almost always
plays a significant role. The next chapter of this thesis will show the vast importance of
traversing rivers, and cooperation with the Army’s Corps of Engineers, in much greater
depth. This example shows the importance of the proper coordination of infantry and
armored units on the battlefield. It is imperative for infantry and armor to work closely
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together to protect one another. Without one, the other is horribly exposed in battle.
Because the 1st Battalion failed to coordinate properly its infantry and anti tank units at
Argentan, it was stopped short of its objectives by German armored units working in
close proximity with foot soldiers. This is yet another lesson the Blue Ridgers had to
learn if they were to defeat Nazi Germany.68
One possible explanation for some of the relative inefficiency of the 80th’s
struggles in using its anti tank units alongside infantry was that the commander of the anti
tank company of the 317th Infantry Regiment, the aforementioned Captain William Koob,
had never before commanded such an organization. To make matters worse, he had never
even been in charge of an anti tank company during training maneuvers. The first time
Koob found himself in such a position was roughly one month before the Blue Ridgers
entered the European Theater.69 Here again is shown the great inexperience of the men
and officers of the 80th Infantry Division. While Koob was able to rally his men and push
on towards their objectives, this captain was nonetheless the epitome of a “green”
commanding officer. Placed in a position such as this, he was able to make adjustments
and eventually effectively employ his armored forces.70 This was not a quality limited to
company level officers, however. General Horace McBride, commander of the 80th
Division, was trained as an artillery officer, and was also placed in an unfamiliar position
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in World War II.71 Those in a variety of different levels of command were forced to learn
how to lead in their new positions as the war progressed.
Ultimately, the Blue Ridgers were able to learn from their mistakes and failures to
have tanks and foot soldiers working closely together within the Battle of Argentan itself.
The 317th Regiment did see more success than their brothers in the 318th because they
were conscious of the need for cooperation with armored units. While the Germans, with
their own combined arms capabilities, held off the regiment, the Americans were able to
move forward in their assault with the help of concentrated fire from tanks, tank
destroyers, and artillery weapons.72 This displays the 80th Division’s ability to take
observations from previous battle experiences and apply them to future operations against
the German Wehrmacht.
The Coordination of Infantry and Artillery
The second element of combined arms examined in this thesis is the coordination
of infantry and artillery units by the Blue Ridge Division. Artillery was an integral part of
the combined arms team, and according to one veteran of the US Army in World War II,
“No one knows the true value and worth of good artillery support better than an
infantryman.”73 Fortunately for the United States Army, artillery doctrine was more
developed than that of armored units at the early stages of the war.74 The primary reason
for this was that American fighting forces had been perfecting the craft of artillery for a
longer period of time than they had been using tanks and tank destroyers. While these
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armored behemoths made their first appearance in the First World War, military forces
have been hurling large projectiles at one another since the age of the catapult and
trebuchet. Even the United States, which did not exist during the Middle Ages, has used
artillery in some shape form or fashion since the nation’s birth in the 18th Century. World
War I in particular was a pivotal conflict in the development of artillery doctrine. As
historian Nick Lloyd demonstrates in his book Hundred Days, the belligerent nations in
the War to End All Wars experienced significant growing pains in perfecting the use of
artillery, but were finally able to improve their use of large caliber weapons near the end
of the war by implementing the use of a creeping artillery barrage rather than a full scale
preparatory bombardment.75 The end result of these factors, Doubler argues, is that “In
comparison to infantrymen and tankers, artillerymen found the transition from peacetime
theory to battlefield conditions less taxing.”76
One of the main reasons for the success of combined artillery and infantry
operations was the ability of Army leadership to delegate authority in the proper manner.
Planning for artillery operations was very centralized at upper echelons of command,
while the operations themselves were left to those officers and NCOs on the front lines.77
Micromanagement is a death knell for combat operations. The chain of command exists
for a purpose, and in the case of artillery units, the Army made effective use of the chain
of command. This shows that the Americans did not rely solely on their industrial might
for victory in the Second World War.
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When the initial assault on Argentan failed, General McBride called for increased
artillery fire on the town in an effort to soften up the German defenses before renewing
the attack.78 This shows that the Blue Ridge Division’s commander understood the
importance of sufficient artillery. However, he had failed to use the artillery at his
disposal in initial preparations for the assault on Argentan. As a general who rose through
the ranks as an artillery officer, McBride should have understood how imperative it was
for the division’s artillery to properly bombard the Germans prior to launching an
attack.79 However, the general did show he could learn from his mistakes and ordered the
artillerymen to barrage the Germans before committing his foot soldiers to a second
attempt at the town. Though McBride himself was not involved directly involved in
individual artillery strikes, the responsibility for the 80th Division as a whole fell upon his
shoulders.
As a testament to the idea that the United States Army’s artillery doctrine was
more developed and sound than that of its armored units, the August 1944 after action
report of the 313th Field Artillery Battalion states, “All procedures and actions were
orthodox and nothing was discarded or added.”80 The artillery units attached to the 80th
Infantry Division were much better prepared to carry out their battlefield missions than
their comrades in armored formations, as evidenced by the fact that this particular
battalion was not forced to significantly change the way it carried out its fire missions
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and provided artillery support to the infantrymen in the vicinity of Argentan. While the
US Army expected World War II to be much more mobile than the First World War,
there were instances in this conflict, like the engagement at Argentan, in which hostilities
resembled the static nature of the Great War, making it difficult for armored units to
operate at the peak combat effectiveness.
A history of the 318th Infantry Regiment states that on the evening of August 19th
“seven battalions of our Corps artillery subjected Argentan to a terrific bombardment,
setting it aflame and crumbing the German’s defenses.”81 This is one of the clearest
examples of the importance of the coordination of infantry and artillery as well as the
80th’s ability to implement this doctrine. It was on the day following this bombardment
that the 80th Infantry Division was able to finally take Argentan and close the Falaise
Gap, showing that the use of artillery fire played a significant role in forcing the Germans
to abandon their defensive positions.82 As previously stated, the initial artillery
bombardment was not sufficient for the Blue Ridgers to capture Argentan. At this point,
the division’s officers understood they would have to increase their use of artillery fire to
allow infantry units to achieve their objectives.
While support from Company A of the 610th Tank Destroyer Battalion and
Company B of the 702nd Tank Battalion was a significant boost to the 80th’s assault on
Argentan, it was ultimately fire from the division’s artillery which allowed the Americans
to take the town.83 This shows that, true to the assertions of Michael Doubler, the
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coordination of infantry and artillery was more developed and effective, at least early in
the war, than that of infantry and armor within the 80th Infantry Division.84 Considering
that this chapter aims to set a benchmark for the performance of the division to compare
other examples of their combat record, it is important to point out that their use of
artillery was more effective than their use of tanks and tank destroyers at this point in the
war, as this necessitates two separate standards, so to speak, by which the division’s
effectiveness is to be measured.
While the 80th Division was an inexperienced combat unit, and faced challenges
in its first battle because of this, not all of the subordinate units of the Blue Ridge
Division struggled to stay afloat. The 313th Field Artillery Battalion’s after action report
for the month of August states, “The first shock-of-combat was not disrupting and all
personnel conducted themselves in a business-like fashion.”85 The most likely
explanation for this assessment is that the United States Army was simply more prepared
to fight with its artillery weapons than its armored components. The United States Army
simply had more experience employing artillery fire than its armored capabilities. Tanks
had been in existence only since the First World War. Artillery, on the other hand, had
been used by military forces for centuries. For this reason, the training and preparation of
artillery gunners was be more comprehensive and effective than the training tankers
experienced.
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Another possible explanation for the relative ease with which the artillerymen
adjusted to the realities of combat at Argentan was their separation from the worst of the
carnage. One soldier of the Blue Ridge Division’s artillery section said, “Everyone talked
about the devastation at Argentan. Most of us in the gun sections missed the visual
horrors of that battle. All we ever saw were the members of our crew, the cooks, and the
ever present 1st Sgt.”86 While artillerymen played a crucial role in combined arms during
the Second World War, their combat experiences were often different than those of
infantrymen and tankers who were in close proximity with the enemy. Artillery guns
were typically separated from the front lines in order to prevent enemy forces from firing
directly upon them. As these men of the division were not as exposed to the bloody
chaotic mess that is front line combat, it was easier for them to adjust to warfare and
perform their duties at Argentan.
Conclusion and Overall Performance of the Blue Ridgers
Considering the 80th Infantry Division had never before seen combat on this scale,
their performance at Argentan is commendable. This is not to say, however, that their
actions in this engagement were without flaws. The division’s ultimate success at
Argentan did not come without a cost. The 80th Division suffered 432 casualties during
the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap.87 When compared to the total number of men in the
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division at the beginning of the month of August (13,943), this means the Blue Ridgers
suffered a 3.1% casualty rate at Argentan.88
Casualties are inevitable in warfare, but the goal of a combat unit is to achieve its
mission with as little bloodshed as possible. Therefore, subsequent chapters will examine
the preponderance of casualties at the Blue Ridge Division’s later engagements in order
to determine if the division suffered more, less, or roughly the same amount of casualties
as they did at Argentan. While casualty analysis is a gruesome (and admittedly imperfect)
method for assessing combat effectiveness, it is a necessary addition to this thesis.
At times, casualty figures may be misleading to researchers and readers. Rather
than examining gross casualty figures alone, they must be analyzed using percentages of
the entire fighting force. Furthermore, as some battles are much larger in scale than others
this must be taken into account as well. For example, the Battle of the Bulge, the topic of
the final chapter of this thesis, was a significantly larger battle than the confrontation at
Argentan. The Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap lasted only a few days. The Battle of the
Bulge, on the other hand, began on 16 December 1944 and did not end until the 25th of
January 1945. Therefore, when comparing battles like these, it is important to remember
issues such as this. While it is not the intent of this thesis to trivialize the sacrifices made
by the men who fought in World War II by reducing them to statistical analysis, it is,
regrettably, one of the most effective, while flawed, methods of assessing combat
effectiveness.
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While the majority of the analysis in this chapter focuses on the coordination of
combined arms, the leadership of the 80th Division is also an important aspect. Men like
Horace McBride also had lessons to learn from battle to apply to future engagements in
Europe. As previously stated, combat leaders are an extremely important part of their
units. It is not a stretch to claim that these men were the glue that held their units
together. The officers of the Blue Ridge Division found themselves in a position where
they would have to improve their leadership and combat command capabilities or face
possible death, destruction, and defeat.
At the Battle of Argentan, and the closing of the Falaise Gap, the 80th Infantry
Division experienced growing pains, as can be expected of a combat unit when it first
encounters live fire and actual enemy soldiers. While the division did eventually achieve
its objectives, it was not without delays or trial and error. There were problems regarding
the proper implementation of armored units, artillery strikes, and issues with
communication between units. However, these men were able to adapt to the deadly new
world in which they found themselves and achieve their mission. While there were initial
obstacles in coordinating the cooperation of infantrymen and tankers, the
infantry/artillery team proved itself a capable force at the Battle of Argentan. Therefore,
the benchmark is set in such a way that armored units showed much more room for
improvement than artillery batteries.
Every combat unit must face its first experience of warfare, and for the 80th
Infantry Division, this came at the French town of Argentan. Major Dean Dominique said
of the aftermath of his first combat experience:
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There we sat in the midst of chaos which neither of us had even dreamed possible
a few weeks before. The stench of death hovered over the entire battlefield and
yet we ate our lunch as calmly as if we sat in a restaurant in the US. The human
body and spirit is infinitely resilient and quickly adapts to any circumstance,
given a strong mind which can assess the situation.89
The shock of combat was not lost on the men of the 80th Division. They were, as the
saying goes, “In the Army now.” If they were to win the war against Nazi Germany and
bring democracy back to the European continent, they would have to learn from both
their successes and failures on the battlefield, beginning with the engagement at
Argentan. The above quote shows that there were at least some men in the Blue Ridge
Division who had the personal ability to overcome the hardships of combat. But would
they be able to take their experiences from their first battle and apply them to future
conflicts with the Wehrmacht? The following chapters of this thesis seek to answer that
question. It should be noted that it is possible that the relative ease with which the Blue
Ridgers adjusted to combat was due to the fact that the Battle of Argentan was a
relatively small engagement when compared to conflicts like the Battle of the Bulge. A
German enemy which was in a more defensive posture than at later battles would not
present the same resistance, thus making the battle comparatively less jarring.
The goal of this chapter is to create a benchmark to which the improvement, or
lack thereof, of the Blue Ridge Division’s combat capabilities may be compared. As the
Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap illustrates, the 80th Division was an inexperienced unit
that was more prepared to employ its artillery units than its armored capabilities. This
was mostly due to the fact that he US Army had a more developed doctrine for artillery
than tanks and tank destroyers. Tanks first appeared on the battlefield in the First World
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War. On the other hand, some semblance of field artillery has been in existence since
before the advent of gunpowder. Both the officers and men of the division faced the
challenge of taking their experiences from this battle and applying it to future
engagements to ensure the 80th was at peak combat performance against its German
adversary.
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CHAPTER III – BLUE RIDGERS AND BROWN WATERS: THE 80TH INFANTRY
DIVISION CROSES THE MOSELLE RIVER

Figure 5. Soldiers of the 80th in the Moselle90
In September 1944, the Blue Ridge Division, numbering 731 officers, 44 warrant
officers, and 13,121 enlisted soldiers, faced one of its greatest challenges: the Moselle
River.91 Averaging a width of 150 feet, six to eight feet deep, and with a current flowing
at a pace of six to seven miles per hour, this body of water and the Germans defending it
would be a thorn in the side of the 80th for a significant portion of the month. While the
river itself created an obstacle for the Division, the terrain on the banks further added to
the Blue Ridgers’ difficulties. The area immediately surrounding the water was not
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suitable for the tanks which are so important to massed firepower and combined arms.
According to one report produced by the 80th, “the steep heights and numerous wooded
areas channel tank movement along well defined avenues; the roads frequently bounded
on one side by deeply ditched streams, on the other side by rises too steep for tanks.”92
Compounded with the fact that traversing a body of water under the threat of enemy fire
was already exceedingly difficult for military forces these factors meant the Blue Ridgers
would be severely challenged as they made their way further east across the Moselle
River.
On 12 September 1944, Andrew Adkins Jr. was part of the 80th Infantry
Division’s attempted crossing of the Moselle River, and was wounded along the way:
One of the shell fragments split open Cpl. Sidney Folmsbee’s arm. I was
going to try and help him when a small piece of shrapnel hit me in the
butt, which hurt like hell! I reached around and felt blood. I thought for
sure that my ass had been shot off, but I could walk and yell, so I knew it
wasn’t too bad.93
A former cadet at The Citadel, The Military College of South Carolina, Adkins’s
testimony is but a small part of the experience of the Blue Ridge Division soldier in
crossing the Moselle.94 Once again, the Blue Ridgers were tasked with finding a way to
achieve their objectives through the use of combined arms warfare. This time, they were
battle tested, and presumably, their combat effectiveness had improved since their
entanglement with the Germans at Argentan and the Falaise Gap.
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The 80th Infantry Division was no longer an inexperienced combat unit. This is
best evidenced by an excerpt from the unit history of the 80th Reconnaissance troop that
discusses how the men of this unit of the division were forced to come to grips with the
fact that they were truly engaged in combat:
The stark reality that the enemy is no longer a dream but cold blooded, living,
breathing men who had just taken the lives of fellows we had lived with for so
long, makes one mad at first that slowly tapers off with the thought that we have
to continue on, that there will be many more days like this, that there will be many
more killed, it’s a hell of a job but from then on it was definitely we or they.95
By the time they arrived at the Moselle River and began their attempts at crossing this
body of water, the Blue Ridgers had made significant strides in adapting their outlooks on
warfare. No longer were they the men who had to be physically forced to fight as they
had at the Battle of Argentan.96 They understood that in order to survive and defeat the
Germans, they would have to give their all on the battlefield.
As in the previous chapter covering the engagement in Argentan and the 80th’s
role in closing the Falaise Gap, Chapter III begins with a brief description of the battle
before analyzing the Division’s combined arms capabilities and propensity to learn from
its previous combat experiences. This chapter argues that, while the Blue Ridgers did
ultimately succeed in crossing the Moselle River, the division would not do so on its first
attempt, in large part due to the failure of the division to properly use artillery support as
the infantry attempted to traverse the waters. Examples such as this display that combat
units do not necessarily learn from their experiences and improve their fighting

95

80th Reconnaissance Troop-Troop History-Part 1, Miscellaneous Reports: 80th Division Field
Artillery Reports, 80th Reconnaissance Troop, 80th DDAP, 13,
http://www.80thdivision.com/UnitHistories/80th_ReconTroop-TroopHistory1.pdf.
96
Hastings, Overlord, 292.

45

capabilities on a linear trajectory. At times, they do not remember the lessons from earlier
engagements and regress in their combat effectiveness. However, the fault often lies with
those in command of combat units rather than the enlisted men. The division’s
leadership, especially General Horace McBride, did not adequately prepare for the river
crossing. This caused the men of the 80th to fail in their initial attempts to reach the
eastern banks.
Furthermore, this chapter examines the question of combat leadership through the
example of Brigadier General Edmund W. Searby, commander of the Division’s artillery
units.97 In particular, this discussion of leadership examines the relationship between
officers and men, as well as the concept of an officer who “leads from the front” rather
than keeping him/herself entirely detached from their soldiers and the events on the
battlefield.
The Situation on the Front
This chapter must begin with a chronicle of the grand narrative of events on the
battle front in the European Theater. After the US Army closed the Falaise Gap, and after
the breakout in Normandy, American forces began their pursuit of the German
Wehrmacht across the French countryside. Fortunately for Allied forces, the encirclement
of the German Seventh Army in the Falaise Pocket, in addition to Wehrmacht losses in
the Normandy campaign, dealt a serious blow to the combat readiness of Hitler’s
military. According to some estimates, anywhere from 20,000 to 40,000 German soldiers
were able to escape entrapment within the Allied pincer. However, relatively few of these
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men were members of actual combat units, and the typical combat division numbered
only a few hundred men.98 In addition to the vast number of men who were killed or
captured during the action in the vicinity of Falaise, the Germans lost a significant
amount of war materiel. Historian Martin Blumenson states, “One commander estimated,
probably with some exaggeration, that not many more than 50 artillery pieces and
perhaps that many tanks reached safety.”99
Although it is difficult to know exactly how many prisoners the Allies captured
when they encircled the Germans near Falaise, estimates hover around 50,000
individuals, with roughly 10,000 Germans killed in action. Furthermore, this number
includes three captured German generals.100 While the Americans did not emerge from
Normandy unscathed, the Allies, and the United States Army, faced an enemy reeling
from significant combat losses as it chased Hitler’s armies across northern France
following the Normandy breakout.
Background of River Crossings
The goal off assaulting forces in a river crossing was to establish a defensible
bridgehead on the opposite side of the body of water. Fortunately, the methods for
crossing rivers were already well established in the United States Army when the 80th
Division arrived at the Moselle. When facing strong resistance, these units would launch
an attack with its men spread out across a significant portion of the battlefield.
Conversely, those facing light resistance would choose individual points to concentrate
their main assault. The crossing itself is exceedingly dangerous for advancing troops
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because they are so exposed while in or on the water. This level of exposure made it
much more difficult for attacking military forces effectively to employ massed firepower
and maneuver. These actions took place in three phases: the actual crossing of the body
of water in boats or on bridges, expansion of a bridgehead to prevent the enemy from
establishing observation locations, and yet further expansion of the bridgehead to prevent
the enemy from harassing those still on the river itself.101 The men of the Blue Ridge
Division were forced to find a way to show their proficiency in combined arms warfare in
order to make their way to the eastern banks of the Moselle River.
The Germans, by nature of their status as defending troops, held the advantage in
river crossings. Furthermore, the terrain of the riverbanks were better suited for defense
as well. The goal of the Wehrmacht was to push American forces back into the water and
towards the western banks of the river. Furthermore, Hitler’s forces enjoyed the luxury of
concentrating their forces at individual crossing sites. The 80th, on the other hand, was
forced to disperse its soldiers across a wide area on the battlefield, thereby weakening
their offensive capabilities.102
Blue Ridgers Crossing the River
The division’s first attempts to cross the Moselle River took place on September
5th and 6th, 1944. However, these assaults on the German positions east of the river were
largely unsuccessful. The divisional history goes so far as to describe these efforts as
“abortive.” The 80th lost 38 assault boats which, ideally, soldiers would have ridden upon
as they crossed the river. Upon the realization that the American forces were not
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adequately prepared to ford the river, the Blue Ridgers withdrew from their positions to
ready themselves for the next assault, which was to take place on the 12th.103

Figure 6. The Blue Ridge Division at the Moselle River104
The plan originally orchestrated by the General Manton S. Eddy, commander of
the XII Corps, of which the 80th Division was a part, was altered at the urgings of General
McBride and General John S. Wood, commander of the 4th Armored Division. These
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officers convinced Eddy that the crossings, which had been delayed by logistical issues,
should occur at several different points, with the armored units following close behind the
foot soldiers, rather than using a single bridge already established by the infantry. The
challenges presented by a disrupted supply chain are telling. It is imperative that a
military force be properly supplied during their operations. The fact that the 80th would
struggle in their first attempt to cross the Moselle may very well have played a role.
While McBride and Wood thought this plan was the best course of action, no one took
the time properly to reconnoiter the battleground.105 Such actions on the part of McBride
and Wood constitute a failure in leadership on the front. It is the responsibility of those in
positions of authority to ensure their subordinates are placed in situations where they are
most likely to succeed. By attempting to cross the river too soon, these men placed their
soldiers in positions of undue danger.
Major James Hayes is highly critical of those who decided to send the 80th
Infantry Division across the river when they did. Although an assessment of the actions
of the division is later in this chapter, it is worth noting that Hayes says this decision was
“a classic example of misplaced optimism on the part of the Corps Commander and his
unwillingness to listen to the facts.”106 For these reasons, the division was forced to
reevaluate its position and the best possible crossing sites. Significant reconnaissance was
in order, and the Blue Ridge Division used the days between their second and third
attempts at crossing the river to gain more information on the terrain and find optimal
crossing points.107 It is worth nothing that the Germans were in a state of retreat.
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Therefore, McBride and other generals would, understandably, have wanted to press the
advantage and continue the advance. However, in this situation, Army leadership would
have done well to gather their troops and choose a better time to launch their assault.
When the day came for the men to make a third attempt to cross the river,
leadership had a plan which was, in theory, much better developed than previous crossing
attempts. The infantry would begin its assault at 0400, with artillery beginning its
supporting fire a quarter of an hour later. Fifty machine guns operated by men from
engineer battalions would provide small arms supporting fire. The 80th used several
pontoon bridges to facilitate its crossing. These bridges were also erected by the US
Army’s Corps of Engineers, who one veteran describes as “unsung heroes.”108 Though
few historians examine the war experience of these engineers, examples such as this
show the crucial importance of those who were responsible for the infrastructure that
allowed the US Army to continue its march across Europe.
Ultimately, the division received orders to attempt another crossing between
Belleville and Dieulouard.109 The 3rd Battalion of the 317th Infantry Regiment reached the
opposite side of the Moselle River and created defensive positions 500 yards inland
around 1500 on the 12th of September. Around the same time, the Germans began
pounding the Blue Ridgers with artillery fire. However, they would not begin a
coordinated counterattack against the Americans until the early hours of 13 September.
The division found itself with a mixture of different types of troops fighting together. The
chaos on the battlefield forced the engineers, tank destroyers, tanks, and foot soldiers to
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fight in close proximity to one another and resulted in difficulty establishing
communications. Ironically, this is the kind of cooperation that combined arms warfare
demands of a military force. In this case, however, the division did not necessarily choose
to have its different branches pushed together.110
After the 317th gained a foothold on the eastern banks of the river, the rest of the
division followed close behind. The next task of the Blue Ridgers was to establish and
consolidate a defensible bridgehead. Doing so would allow the division to bring the rest
of its men and materiel across the river to continue the advance.111 Luckily, the
Americans attacked a location from which the Wehrmacht had recently removed soldiers
to shore up defenses in other locations. The Germans would not give up Dieulouard
easily, however. The Wehrmacht sent soldiers back to the area of the American crossing
in an effort to prevent the Doughboys from advancing any further.112 In order for the 80th
Infantry Division to truly hold its position on the Moselle River and ensure it could
continue its push across Europe, it was necessary to defend the tenuous bridgehead from
German counterattacks.
After the 317th Regiment reached the opposite bank, General McBride sent the
318th Regiment across near Bezaumont, France. Much like their comrades in the 317th,
the soldiers of the 318th were placed on high alert for the possibility of a German
counterattack on the evening of 12 September 1944. In crossing the Moselle on this
occasion, the regiment used 3,621 rounds of ammunition. For its part, the 319th Infantry
Regiment conducted reconnaissance operations in a nearby forest on the eastern banks of
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the river to determine enemy positions and possible locations for a counterattack from the
Germans.113
When the Wehrmacht did launch the anticipated counterattack on the 13th of
September, the division held its positions, with the infantry units receiving support from
the 702nd Tank Battalion. The enemy—elements of the 29th Panzer Grenadier Division—
attacked with artillery and tank support. The 80th was learning that in order to be
successful against the Germans, it must have close cooperation between its infantry and
armored units. While it was not a failure of the infantry/armor team in the first attempt at
crossing the river, it was nonetheless a failure in the combined arms team itself. In order
to avoid further problems, the division had to make sure its foot soldiers and tankers
worked together in a symbiotic relationship.114
The 4th Armored Division, the armored component of the US Army that worked
so closely with the 80th Infantry Division, began crossing the river around 0830 hours on
the morning of the 13th of September, meaning the 4th Armored did not begin to reach the
opposite side of the river until over seventeen hours after the 317th Regiment reached
defensive positions on the eastern banks. While there was some coordination of infantry
and artillery units as the foot soldiers attempted to cross the waters, armored units did not
cross the river en masse until a much later point in time. This displays that the leadership
of the 80th Division, and 4th Armored Division, still had lessons to learn if they were to
reach peak combat effectiveness in the European Theater of Operations. Seventeen and
one half hours is a veritable eternity on the battlefield, and the soldiers of the 80th
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Division needed all the support they could muster from their comrades in armored units.
It is worth noting, however, the near impossibility of a simultaneous crossing of armored
and infantry units. Simple logic states that there is only so much room for these elements
on the river. Therefore, it is understandable that tankers and foot soldiers were unable to
be in close proximity to one another at this time.115
While elements of fthe division faced difficulties in actually reaching the other
side of the Moselle River, a different story presents itself when examining the Blue
Ridgers’ fighting capabilities in combat in and near towns on the eastern side of the river.
The 1st Battalion of the 317th Regiment moved from positions near Landremont to a hill
nearby the community of Serrieres on the 13th of September. Meanwhile, the 3rd Battalion
of the 318th Regiment was able to capture the town of Atton with relative ease on the 14th.
This operation of the 318th was closely supported by elements of the 702nd Tank
Battalion. This close coordination of armored and infantry units was crucial in the capture
of Atton. Furthermore, the Blue Ridgers were able to defend against German
counterattacks. While it was difficult to employ combined arms while in the act of
crossing the Moselle River, the division showed that it possessed a greater ability to use
firepower en masse when they were once again on dry land.116
Until the 80th Infantry Division could be said to have control of the bridgehead on
the eastern banks of the Moselle River, its primary objective was to stave off wave after
wave of German counterattacks. While the division showed it still had further lessons to
learn were it to reach peak fighting power, the fact that the Blue Ridgers were able to
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withstand these powerful assaults from the Wehrmacht shows that they were not an
incompetent combat division. Efficiency on the battlefield, however, does not imply
perfection. The 80th showed it had room for improvement while still achieving its
primary objectives in the European Theater. For example, St. Genevieve and the nearby
Hill 382 were alternatively under the control of the Americans and Germans on several
occasions. However, the 80th was able to emerge from the struggle victorious. As the
Germans launched their vicious attacks against American forces at the Moselle, the 3rd
Battalion of the 319th Regiment found itself surrounded and cut off from its comrades in
other units. It was during this encounter on the 15th of September that General Edmund
W. Searby was killed in combat.117
On 16 September, the Germans attempted their final assault which was meant to
push the Blue Ridgers back into and across the river. The historical record states,
…attacks against both flanks failed in the face of aggressive maneuvering by
infantry and armor units and artillery and air support. Having failed to push the
Americans back into the Moselle, the Germans began to withdraw toward the
east. This last effort marked the end of the Dieulouard bridgehead battles, a series
of engagements in which the American combined arms team showed its defensive
abilities against the enemy’s best efforts.

This clearly shows the ability of the division to stave off the German forces through the
use of combined arms. While an imperfect coordination of massed firepower, the 80th
nonetheless coordinated its infantry, armor, and artillery units in close cooperation with
one another to defeat the Germans in the most efficient way possible.
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The Coordination of Infantry and Artillery
One of the problems which artillery units reported after the battle was a lack of
understanding between infantry and artillery units. The after action report of the 313th
Field Artillery Battalion for the month of September states, “There is a marked disregard
on the part of the infantry commander on certain limitations of Field Artillery.”118 It is
imperative that the units of different branches of combined arms understand the
capabilities and limitations of one another. Without this understanding, a unit is incapable
of operating effectively on the battlefield. This report also points out the importance of
effective communications between all individuals involved in the use of artillery fire. It
states that the location of the forward observer (men who were attached to infantry units
to direct artillery strikes) was often not ideal, but that it was essential to maintain constant
communication with this individual.119 These are lessons the 80th, and its attached
artillery units, would have to keep in mind in the coming months as they drove towards
the German homeland.
As previously stated, the 80th Infantry Division did not make effective use of its
artillery in its first attempt to cross the Moselle River. This was a grave mistake on the
part of the division’s leadership. American artillery doctrine was much more developed
than its armored doctrine during the war.120 Had the river crossing been preceded by a
sufficient artillery barrage, the lives of many men may have been saved and subsequent
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attempts at reaching the far banks may not have been necessary. This was a failure in
military planning and operations. More importantly, perhaps, it was a breakdown in
military leadership. The officers in charge of this river crossing, being responsible for the
lives of the men under their command, should have taken the time to properly prepare for
the river crossing.
Interestingly, during the planning phase for the crossing of the Moselle, Blue
Ridge Division leadership understood that adequate artillery support was needed if the
infantrymen were to reach their objectives on the opposite banks of the river. A summary
of interviews with members of the division states, “Representatives of the air support and
of the artillery were present…It was understood that both air and artillery support were to
be used.”121 Although officers in the division understood that artillery support was vital to
success in this operation, the implementation of their plans resulted in failure in the initial
crossing attempt. While the Blue Ridgers had learned from previous experience that
artillery was necessary, they had not yet applied these lessons on the battlefield. This
resulted in significantly more casualties than may have occurred in the event of proper
combined arms coordination. Again, however, it is possible that American leadership
believed the time was right to press the advantage and continue the assault against the
retreating Germans. Unfortunately, in this instance, things did not go according to their
plans.
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There were instances, however, when the Blue Ridgers attempted to make
effective use of artillery fire at the Moselle River. When in support of the 80th, the 314th
Field Artillery Battalion, the 905th Field Artillery Battalion engaged in rolling artillery
barrages to facilitate the division’s attempts at crossing. A rolling barrage is the tactic of
moving artillery fire forward at the same pace as infantry units.122 This requires that all
parties involved pay extremely close attention to their actions, as a mistake can lead to
casualties from friendly fire. Unfortunately, this particular attack did not achieve its
objectives by darkness on the 6th of September. While the forces of the Blue Ridge
Division were able to make their way across the river to the German defensive positions,
they were unable to overtake their enemy on this particular attempt at crossing the river.
However, this failure cannot be laid entirely on the divisions’ artillery support. German
defensive positions were particularly strong, as the Wehrmacht made use of heavy
fortifications and pillboxes, which present a significant obstacle to attacking forces.123
The importance of cooperation between infantry and artillery is shown through
the account of a veteran of the 80th Infantry Division, Colonel William N. Taylor, who
stated,
At the time I joined the division, it was conducting regimental combat team size
field problems, and the 319th was actually in the field on one of these when I
reported for duty. I recall on this exercise, as well as others that followed, the
905th always worked with us so closely and so well that we in the Infantry
considered them as much a part of the regiment as the Infantry units. This same
fine support and close relationship continued during combat right up to the time I
was wounded…124
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This example shows the close relationship between infantry and artillery units and how
much these groups worked together. Due to these factors, it was imperative that infantry
and artillery officers and men learned how to cooperate and communicate with one
another to ensure the success of the 80th Infantry Division on the battlefield. Furthermore,
Colonel Taylor’s letter continues to display that American artillery doctrine was more
developed during the Second World War than that of armored units.
On the 14th of September, the 3rd Battalion of the 317th Infantry Regiment
received an extremely effective artillery barrage from the Cannon Company of the 317th
Regiment and the 313th Field Artillery Battalion. A member of this unit stated, “The
artillery brought four battalions of time fire on this point, and the slaughter of German
troops was terrific. The dead lay on the hill like flies.”125 This particular event occurred
after the successful crossing of the river. At this point in the battle, division leadership
understood the importance of using artillery fire to great effect against German forces.
For this reason, large amounts of ordnance were fired on the Wehrmacht, allowing the
Blue Ridgers to stave off a German counterattack, showing a propensity for the division
to learn from its previous experiences on the battlefield.
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Figure 7. An American Soldier at the Moselle126

Although the 80th Infantry Division did not properly utilize its artillery units
during the early stages of the crossing of the Moselle River, they were able to improve in
this aspect and overcome the Wehrmacht standing in their way. The initial crossing of the
river was a catastrophe due to the lack of adequate artillery support for the foot soldiers.
However, subsequent crossings, as well as the consolidation and defense of the Moselle
bridgehead on the eastern banks, were more successful because the Blue Ridgers and
their leadership were more effective in using their artillery capabilities in conjunction
with their infantry components.
The Coordination of Infantry and Armor
One of the challenges the Blue Ridgers faced in crossing the Moselle was finding
a way effectively to move their tanks and tank destroyers from the western banks to the
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eastern. Due to terrain features and inclement weather, the ground was not suited for the
transportation of these heavy vehicles.127 Simply put, while the Blue Ridge Division had
more combat experience than at the Battle of Argentan, the crossing of the Moselle River
would present a different challenge altogether. Nonetheless, the core of the division’s
mission had not changed. This American division would have to find a way to effectively
coordinate the various branches of combined arms in such a way that they complimented
and supported one another in the European Theater.
The nature of warfare during river crossings poses much different challenges than
those in which the primary objective is a city, fortified location, or geographic features
like a hill. While in battles with these characteristics, foot soldiers and tanks may operate
in close proximity with one another, this is not the case during conflicts in which a
military force must navigate its way across a river. The situation was no different for the
80th Infantry Division at the Moselle River in September 1944. The 317th Regiment’s
goal on the opposite side of the river was to establish a defensible bridgehead. Only then
would the 4th Armored Division be able to send the bulk of its men and materiel to the
eastern banks.128 Because of this, it was extremely difficult for tanks and tank destroyers
to directly support infantry units in the act of crossing the river.
This is not to say, however, that such fire support was wholly impossible. One
tactic which the US Army employed when fighting with tank support was the direct fire
of large caliber weapons (i.e. artillery pieces and armored vehicles) at enemy positions.129

127

Murrell, Operational History, 35.
80th Division-Moselle River Crossing Analysis-4-5 September 1944, Miscellaneous Reports:
th
80 DDAP, 1,
http://www.80thdivision.com/AfterActionReports/80th_MoselleRiverCrossing_Analysis.pdf.
129
Doubler, Closing With the Enemy, 111, 135.
128

61

In fact, the Blue Ridge Division, with the assistance of the 610th Tank Destroyer
Battalion, employed direct fire of large caliber weapons at the Moselle River during the
initial crossing which fell short of its objectives.130 While the division did attempt to
provide mutual support for its infantrymen and tankers, it was ultimately not until the
men reached the opposite side of the river and established a bridgehead that truly
effective armored support arrived.
Major James Hayes of the 317th Infantry Regiment stated, “We emplaced about
32 machineguns, with two tank destroyers, along the forward slope of the hill, Boi de
Cuite. These guns were emplaced aimed and set for overhead fire by the infantry, and
were to be fired by the engineers during the crossing.”131 This shows that the division
understood the importance of making sure infantry and armored units were operating in
close cooperation with one another, even if they could not be in each other’s immediate
proximity. From the lessons learned at Argentan, leadership of the Blue Ridge Division
worked to improve the unit’s combat effectiveness and fighting capabilities.
This example also shows the division’s ability to think on its feet and adapt to
challenges presented by different fields of battle and terrain features. While they were
unable to have tanks move alongside infantrymen as they crossed the Moselle River,
officers and NCOs of the division found new methods to make the most of the firepower
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at their disposal. Although it is the United States Marine Corps that adheres to the idea of
“improvise, adapt, and overcome,” the 80th Infantry Division of the United States Army
showed the ability to do just that during hostilities at the Moselle River.
Another example of the importance of the relationship between infantrymen and
their comrades in armored vehicles took place on the 13th of September and involved men
of the 2nd Battalion of the 318th Infantry Regiment. Still waiting for tanks and tank
destroyers to arrive from the western banks of the Moselle, these men were caught in the
open by German tanks with no way to defend themselves. Left with no other options,
they were forced to surrender to the Germans and become prisoners of war. However,
once their own armored support arrived, these Blue Ridgers were rescued and able to
continue their fight against the Wehrmacht.132 Because the difficulties in sending armored
units across the river after foot soldiers, American infantrymen found themselves at a
disadvantage on the battlefield. However, division leadership had learned the importance
of ensuring these units were in close proximity with one another, and sent tanks and tank
destroyers across the river as fast as possible to avoid situations such as this.
Once the division was able to send its armored components across the Moselle
River, the effectiveness of the combined arms team improved significantly. As previously
stated, the division knew from its experiences at the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap how
to ensure cooperation between infantry and armored units. On the 16th of September, the
day of the Germans’ final attempts to repel the 80th Divisions assault across the Moselle,
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two battalions of the 317th Infantry Regiment were able to stop a Wehrmacht
counterattack launched at the bridgehead. According to Robert Murrell’s history, “The
enemy counterattacked three times against the 2nd Battalion from Foret De Focq, using
infantry and armor. The attack was repulsed by the 3rd and 1st Battalions along with help
from the 702nd Tank Battalion.”133 Interestingly, the 3rd Battalion of the regiment lost the
town of St. Genevieve to a German assault, and the history does not make mention of
support from armored units.134 Taken from this example, the Blue Ridgers showed they
knew the most effective way to fight was through the close coordination of combined
arms capabilities. However, they were not able to properly carry out this doctrine at every
available opportunity.
The papers of the 4th Armored Division show that the proper use of tanks is
simply different when faced with river crossings. A report used to teach proper tank
warfare doctrine at the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
states, “Except for such employment as attacks on fortified areas, river crossings, etc., the
tanks of an armored division should lead as the striking force, even though the proportion
of tanks available is less than that of infantry.”135 While this report deals specifically with
events which transpired at the Battle of the Bulge, it nonetheless shows the importance of
a combat unit reaching the understanding that different terrain features and objectives on
the battlefield necessitate different tactics. In the case of the Moselle River crossing, the
80th Infantry Division was forced to employ its armored components in the most effective
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way possible, which meant tanks and tank destroyers would not be able to operate in
close proximity to infantrymen until both components of the combined arms team
reached the eastern banks. These examples show that, while the division was imperfect,
the Blue Ridgers had the ability to learn from their experiences on the battlefield to make
the most of their combined arms capabilities and improve overall combat effectiveness.
Assessing Overall Performance
Ultimately, the Blue Ridge Division was successful in crossing the Moselle River.
However, there were problems with its efforts from the outset of the assault. As previously
stated, division leadership (i.e. Horace McBride) did not adequately prepare for the men to
ford the river. While Major James Hayes blames the commander of the XII Corps, McBride
should not avoid scrutiny.136 By failing adequately to plan for this combat operation,
McBride was “planning to fail.” For any military operation to be successful, leadership
must take the time to ensure they have all the facts before proceeding with their mission.
Had the commander of the Blue Ridgers realized the need to ensure his units had accurate
intelligence on the terrain and quality and quantity of German defenses, disaster on the first
crossing could have been avoided altogether. An analysis of the 80th’s actions at the
Moselle River shows that the Americans did not have an adequate picture of the situation
they faced. In particular, military intelligence could not ascertain the nature of artillery at
the disposal of the Germans.137 While it is impossible to know every minute detail of the
capability of enemy forces in battle, it was nonetheless a mistake to proceed with the
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crossing of the Moselle River without ensuring the 80th and other units had a better
understanding of what lay before them.
Many in the armed forces know the core tenant of Murphy’s Law: anything that
can go wrong will go wrong. With this in mind, military leaders, including those of the 80th
Infantry Division, owed it to their men and their country to ensure they had all the facts
before deciding on a course of action. While noble to attempt to end a war quickly, and
potentially spare soldiers from being maimed or killed, which these men were presumably
attempting to do, their mistake was in rushing to launch a river crossing without making
the necessary preparations. Thus, many men may have needlessly lost their lives.
As in the analysis of the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap, an examination of casualty
figures helps researchers understand the 80th Division’s effectiveness at the Moselle River.
During the month of September 1944, the Blue Ridgers suffered 40 officers and 539
enlisted men killed, 118 officers and 2,279 enlisted men wounded, and 26 officers and 659
enlisted men determined to be missing in action. In total, the division saw 3,651 casualties
during this month. Of these, 569 men made the ultimate sacrifice on the battlefields of
France.138 While this is a significantly large number when compared to the casualty figures
from the month of August, it must be remembered that one of the major battles of that
month, the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap, was significantly shorter than the crossing of
the Moselle.139
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When compared to the division’s total strength at the beginning of August, the Blue
Ridgers suffered a 3.8% casualty rate. In contrast, this number jumps to a much higher
26.3% for the month of September.140 Taken at face value, this would mean that the
division’s combat effectiveness was significantly lower in September than in August.
However, the fact that the Germans defending the Moselle River enjoyed a marked
advantage due to the nature of the battlefield and their defensive positions that they did not
experience during the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap. As stated in the previous chapter on
the engagement at Argentan, casualty figures are a useful tool for measuring combat
effectiveness. However, confounding variables should not be overlooked in this type of
analysis.
In the end, while the Blue Ridge Division succeeded in crossing the Moselle River
and continuing its drive across Europe, the men and leaders of this division still had lessons
to learn if they were to reach peak combat performance. McBride and other officers in the
80th would have to continue to improve the division’s ability to coordinate its infantry,
armor, and artillery on the battlefield. Otherwise, the Blue Ridgers would continue to see
increases in casualties and further difficulty in achieving their objectives and defeating
their German adversaries.

140

G-1 After Action Report, 1-30 September, 1944, After Action Reports, 80 th DDAP, 1,
http://www.80thdivision.com/AfterActionReports/AAR_G-1_SEP44.pdf.; G-1 After Action Report, 1-31
August, 1944, After Action Reports, 80th DDAP, 1,
http://www.80thdivision.com/AfterActionReports/AAR_G-1_AUG44.pdf.; Supplemental Data September
1944, 80th Division Operational History, 80th DDAP, 2, http://www.80thdivision.com/80thOperationalHistory/80thOperHist-Sep44_Pt2.pdf; Supplemental Data August 1944, 80th Division
Operational History, 80th DDAP, 2, http://www.80thdivision.com/80th-OperationalHistory/80thOperHistAug44_Pt2.pdf.

67

Combat Leadership at the Moselle
One of the most well-known memoirs from World War II’s other theater, the
recollections of Eugene B. Sledge, is likewise permeated with commentary on the
leadership this enlisted Marine saw in the Pacific Theater.141 The preponderance of
soldiers who wrote about their thoughts on leadership shows the importance of those in
charge on the battlefield. As such, this chapter includes an examination of the leadership
qualities of the Blue Ridge Division’s artillery section commander, Brigadier General
Edmund W. Searby.142 Officers like Searby are integral parts of military organizations.
Therefore, it is extremely important to examine their leadership capabilities as they are
crucial factors in the outcome of a battle. Effective leaders can turn momentum towards
their side of the conflict. Likewise, incompetent leadership can lead to failure on the
battlefield. As this section of the chapter will show, General Searby was well-respected
by his men and embodied the idea of the officer who “led from the front.”
Before examining the leadership of Searby, one must understand what was
considered quality leadership in the United States Army. Only then can one understand
why Searby’s men remembered him in such a positive way and respected him so greatly.
Generally speaking, Americans valued leaders who cared for the wellbeing of those
under their authority or command. Historian Danny S. Parker argues that soldiers in the
United States Army expected unique qualities of their superiors when compared to how
other nations like Germany or Great Britain. Americans valued leadership by consensus,
which Parker states arises from American democratic ideals. Furthermore, he argues,
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“American commanders, like the GI troops, were expected to have a human side other
than just soldiering; any US leader had to be a regular guy. This meant the ability to get
the job done when need be, but then to ‘knock off’ at the appropriate times, play poker
and down a drink. Anything less was suspect.”143 By contrast, Parker states that the
British were not fond of leadership by consensus and mostly based their qualifications for
an officer’s commission on social status. In Germany, on the other hand, one rose
through the ranks and achieved higher status through performance in combat alone.144
There are times when some soldiers see examples of extremely poor leadership
from a superior and learn what not to do when interacting with those they command. One
powerful example of this is Major Winters’s experiences with the man who was in charge
of training his company for combat in Europe. Winters says this man, Captain Herbert
Sobel, was “not just unfair; he was plain mean.”145 This description of Sobel displays that
Winters believed officers, and anyone placed in a position of leadership, should show
compassion to his or her charges where appropriate. Winters’s views of leadership are
summed up perfectly in one line from his memoir: “The key to a successful combat
leader is to earn respect, not because of rank, but because you are a man.”146 A true leader
is one who commands respect because of his or her personal qualities rather than the
position of power in which they find themselves.
Eugene Sledge also delves into the issues of leadership on the front lines of
combat. His company commander for part of his time in the Pacific Theater was a man
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named Captain Andrew Haldane. The young Marine greatly appreciated the interest
Haldane showed in his life outside of the Corps.147 Sledge’s commentary in this situation
shows the importance of an officer who cares for the wellbeing of his men. A leader’s
greatest asset are the people under his or her command, and when he or she shows they
care for their charges, subordinates are more willing to carry out a task for their leaders.
Another example of excellent leadership from With the Old Breed is when Sledge
retells the time he witnessed an officer from the rear echelon—such as those in charge of
supply—helping unload ammunition during the Battle of Peleliu. Although this man was
not required to move towards the battle front and help enlisted men with this job, he
nevertheless chose to do so, potentially putting himself in harm’s way. This episode left
an impression on Sledge, who goes on to mention that this officer, Captain Paul Douglas,
was wounded later in the war because he continued to carry ammunition to those who so
desperately needed it. Clearly this was a man who cared for the welfare of his subordinate
Marines and had excellent leadership qualities.148
However, much like Winters, Sledge sees examples of poor leadership during
World War II. A first lieutenant whom Sledge refers to only as “Shadow” is portrayed in
a very negative light:
Shadow’s disposition was worse than his appearance. Moody, illtempered, and highly excitable, he cursed the veteran enlisted men worse
than most DIs (writer’s note: drill instructors) did recruits in boot camp.
When he was displeased with a Marine about something, he didn’t
reprimand the man the way our other officers did. He threw a tantrum.
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Sledge’s commentary clearly shows that enlisted men were acutely aware of the
leadership qualities of their military superiors. Generally speaking, those who can best
comment on the leadership of those in a military organization are the individuals who
occupy lower positions along the chain of command. For this reason, commentary on the
leadership qualities of Edmund Searby will draw from sources of his subordinates within
the 80th Infantry Division.
While these examples show the leadership of officers significantly lower on the
chain of command than General Searby, they nonetheless show the importance of
effective leadership as well as some of the qualities which make up a good leader. While
not all of these traits translate exactly to the qualities of an effective flag officer, they are
relevant to general nonetheless. For example, a general is not expected to be on the front
lines with his or her soldiers, a quality general must make his presence felt among his
subordinates. As this discussion of the leadership qualities of Edmund Searby will
display, the general was highly regarded by his men, and certainly fits the bill of an
excellent combat leader. “I will always remember General Searby with a special
fondness, courages, and many other fine traits too numerous to mention and still with an
excellent sense of humor,” said one of the men under Searby’s command in the European
Theater.149 While this quote does not provide specifics of this individual’s leadership
qualities, it does well to set the stage for a discussion of them. To be remembered in such
high regard by a veteran of the 80th Infantry Division is indicative of a man who took
great care to be an effective military leader.
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Another quality of an exceptional leader is that he or she holds subordinates
accountable for their actions and expects them to act with integrity. One such example of
General Searby displaying this quality is detailed by his personal driver, George W.
Shear:
Another time we had captured some prisoners and were sitting around
under some trees. A Lieutenant of the Fifth Rangers came up and started
berating the men for not using their guns on the prisoners, not noticing the
general. The general then stood up and said ‘If you big brave boys want to
show them go ahead, we already have them captured and taken their
weapons.’ The lieutenant looked like his face fell in when he saw the
general. His men looked sheepish too.150
This example also shows that Edmund Searby had the propensity to show compassion to
those under his supervision. Even more remarkable is the fact that the men he was
protecting were his enemies, members of the German Wehrmacht. Even though he was
embroiled in one of the most brutal conflicts of the 20th Century, Searby nonetheless
understood the value of human life. He was not willing to allow his men to mistreat their
prisoners, which would, in addition, bring discredit both to the 80th Infantry Division and
the United States Army, something the general would not tolerate.
General Searby in this example also showed exceptional leadership in this
situation simply by being present with some of his, presumably, enlisted soldiers. Much
like the Marine officer who helped Sledge and his comrades unload ammunition in the
Pacific, Searby was not a combat commander who refused to venture toward the front
lines of the battlefield. He knew that his men were risking their lives for their country,
and wanted to display the solidarity he felt with the soldiers. In doing so, General Searby
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displayed the leadership trait of an individual who cares for the wellbeing of his charges.
This seemingly insignificant event involving the general shows more than one of his
excellent leadership qualities: both his refusal to bring discredit upon the United States
Army and the care he showed for the enlisted men under his command.
Quality leaders are tasked with knowing when to make sacrifices for the greater
good of the mission. There is no easy decision in combat, and men like Searby must be
prepared to make these decisions. Again the general’s personal driver tells of one of his
interactions with the division’s artillery commander:
The general wanted to see what was holding up the column so we drove
up to the lead vehicles. Found a German road block in a grove of trees up
ahead. A major reported to the general. He said if we sent a tank around
the corner it will be knocked out. General Searby called for artillery which
shelled the trees. General told the major to send the lead tank out followed
by two more. The lead tank moved out and was hit and set on fire. The
other two moved around it and got into the German positions and ended
the resistance. The major, feeling badly about his tank, said we sacrificed
one tank. The general said ‘We could have sacrificed the whole
column.’151
In this situation, Searby understood that, while it is unfortunate and not desirable to lose
any men or materiel, it is nonetheless a necessity of warfare. While the general certainly
did not desire for the tank to be destroyed, or the men inside to be maimed or killed, he
knew that in order for the 80th ID to advance across Europe and defeat the Germans, they
would be called upon to make sacrifices. Military action is notorious for placing men and
women into positions in which they have to make nearly impossible choices. However,
because the only wrong decision is to make no decision at all, Edmund Searby chose to
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send a tank into enemy fire for the greater good of the mission and the nation, proving
himself to be an effective leader.
One of the most powerful examples that displays the leadership of Edmund
Searby took place on the 14th of September 1944. While helping soldiers of the 80th
Division fight off a German counterattack, the general was killed by enemy fire.152
According to Searby’s driver, the general consistently put himself in dangerous situations
as he attempted to find the best position to place his forward observers.153 It was for
reasons such as this that one of Searby’s subordinate commanders commented that he
believed those in infantry units were more familiar with the general than his own artillery
solders.154 A man willing to risk his own life, something many general officers are
certainly hesitant to do, Searby showed that he prioritized the mission and the wellbeing
of his own men over his own personal safety. The general made the infamous ultimate
sacrifice for his comrades and his country, displaying that he was an exceptional leader
willing to do whatever was asked of him to ensure victory against Hitler and Nazi
Germany.
In researching the war record of General Searby, one does come across an
instance in which the 80th’s artillery commander stumbled in his leadership and military
capabilities at the Moselle River. The 317th Infantry Regiment was forced to make more
than one attempt at crossing the river, and the first attempt was a failure for several
reasons. However, in regards to General Searby’s leadership, the artillery fire in support
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of the regiment was simply insufficient.155 While Searby consistently made efforts to care
for his men and their wellbeing, he did not effectively do so when the 317th made its first
attempt to cross the river. As the commander of the division’s artillery, it was his
responsibility to ensure those struggling to reach the far banks had the support they
needed to achieve their objectives. Unfortunately for the men of the 317th, Searby failed
in his duty to provide them with adequate artillery fire to cover their crossing.
In the defense of General Searby, he did have orders from higher command, in
this case General McBride, to proceed with the river crossing. However, if leadership and
decision making by consensus was truly valued in the United States Army, then Searby
could have potentially raised respectful objections to his orders.156 Some of Searby’s
superior officers showed a propensity to make decisions without fully understanding the
situation at hand.157 Had the general displayed more effective leadership at this point in
the war, he would have recognized that his units needed more time effectively to prepare
their artillery positions and procedures for the task at hand. Unfortunately, he did not do
so, and the first attempts at reaching the far banks ended in failure and significant
casualties for the Blue Ridge Division.158
Nevertheless, Searby consistently proved himself to be an effective leader during
the Second World War. His leadership qualities can be summarized in one quote from
Colonel Daniel J. Minahan, commander of the 314th Field Artillery Battalion: “He was
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one of the finest men I ever knew. Outstanding in devotion to duty, loved the Army,
absolutely fearless, most concerned about the welfare of his men, indifferent to personal
discomfort to himself.”159 A military leader can receive no higher praise than that from
his or her subordinate soldiers. As evidenced by the accounts of his driver and other men
who served under Searby’s command, this general was, while imperfect, beloved by his
men and dedicated to his duty as an officer of the United States Army. Individuals like
General Edmund Searby played a crucially important role in leading the Allied forces
towards victory.
Ultimately, those in positions of leadership play a vital role in the outcome of
military actions. While it is the men in the lowest enlisted positions who do most of the
“dirty work” or “heavy lifting,” there must be an individual to rally soldiers together at all
different levels of command. Without someone with extensive knowledge of the finer
details of military planning, training, and the conduction of combat, armed forces units
can find themselves without direction. However, an effective military leader is someone
who has much more than knowledge of the military alone. Much as an athlete with raw
talent must refine his or her abilities to succeed in their sport, military leaders must take
their knowledge and apply it with effective leadership techniques. This discussion of
Genreal Searby has barely scratched the surface of what an effective leader should be.
While care for the wellbeing of one’s subordinates, willingness to lead from the front and
be put in harm’s way, and the ability to make difficult decisions are vital characteristics
for a combat leader, this is by no means an exhaustive list of desirable qualities. Such an
examination of military leadership could without question easily fill a massive tome, let
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alone a short section of a master’s thesis. Leadership is so vital because, according to
General George Patton, “‘Leadership is the thing that wins battles. I have it, but I’ll be
damned if I can define it.’”160 Without competent leaders, an army cannot function or
succeed on the battlefield.
Conclusion
There were many instances in which the United States Army was forced to cross
rivers in the European Theater.161 However, there were few, if any, which matched the
lasting importance of the confrontation at the Moselle River. This particular event of the
Lorraine Campaign was used, at least up until 2014, as a case study by the United States
Army at the Infantry School and the Command and General Staff Colleges.162
Furthermore, some have stated that the crossing of the Moselle “had no parallel in US
military history since Ulysses S. Grant’s army struggled to cross the Mississippi and
strike at Vicksburg in 1863.”163 To draw comparisons between this battle and one of the
decisive confrontations in the American Civil War alone shows the importance of the
crossing of the Moselle River. For these reasons, it is imperative to continue studying the
performance of the United States Army and the 80th Infantry Division at this battle.
The 80th Division’s experiences at the Moselle River indicate that military units
do not necessarily learn and improve their combat effectiveness on a linear trajectory, as
shown by their failure to employ massed firepower from the onset of this battle.
However, while the 80th Division was not successful in its initial crossing of the Moselle,
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it did learn from its mistakes and improve its use of combined arms warfare; especially in
regards to the use of sufficient artillery fire. In the case of armored units, the primary
obstacle of the division was determining how to best use their tanks and tank destroyers
in a situation in which they could not be in close proximity to infantry units as they
crossed the river itself. Once the division reached the opposite side of the river, armored
units were utilized in their full capacity as support for infantrymen. While tanks and other
armored vehicles are crucial components of the combined arms team, it was ultimately
the failure of the artillery branch during the division’s first attempt to cross the river
which was the deciding factor in the failure of the crossing itself. Once the Blue Ridgers
effectively used their full artillery capabilities, they were able to make their way across
the water and create a defensible bridgehead on the opposite banks of the Moselle River.
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CHAPTER IV – BLUE RIDGERS AT THE BULGE: THE 80TH INFANTRY DIVISION
IN HITLER’S ARDENNES OFFENSIVE

Figure 8. Americans in Heiderscheid, Luxembourg164
One of the greatest challenges the Blue Ridge Division faced during the Second
World War came in the winter of 1944 and 1945.165 One of the primary objectives for the
80th Division was the liberation of the US Army’s 101st Airborne Division which was
trapped in the encircled city of Bastogne, Belgium. This confrontation, known as the
Battle of the Bulge, took place from 16 December 1944 to 25 January 1945. The
Germans, having been in a state of retreat virtually since the breakout in Normandy,

164

Tracy Dungan, Heiderscheid, Luxembourg, 1944, 400x295 px, 80th Division Digital Archives
Project (80 DDAP), Photo Collections, Tracy Dungan Collection,
http://www.80thdivision.com/photos/Dungan/Dungan.html.
165
The Battle of the Bulge has a large historiography from which to gather information. While
only a few have been directly cited in this work in presenting a narrative of the greater events on the front,
what follows is a more comprehensive list of works which at least tangentially examine the battle. Weigley,
Eisenhower’s Lieutenants; Mansoor, The GI Offensive in Europe; Hastings, Inferno; Ray J. Clark, Journey
to Hell: The Fiery Furnaces of Buchenwald (Raleigh, North Carolina: Pentland Press, Inc., 1996); Pearson
and Ludt, Enroute to the Redoubt; Winters and Kingseed, Beyond Band of Brothers; Ambrose, Band of
Brothers.
th

79

launched a last ditch assault in an effort to turn the tide of the war in their favor. Because
this battle was, at least initially, defensive in nature for the US Army, it would present a
much different test for the men of the 80th Infantry Division. Furthermore, Hitler directed
his forces to send this attack through the Ardennes Forest, legends of which led many to
believe was impenetrable by a military force.166
These factors meant the Blue Ridgers would be forced to fight in significantly
different terrain when compared to their engagements at Argentan and the Moselle River.
However, it was the weather these men endured that was one of the greatest obstacles to
success in the Ardennes Forest. William W. Lamond, a veteran of the 80th Infantry
Division stated, when asked what he believed was the most difficult part of the Battle of
the Bulge, “It was the cold and no place to get warm.”167 In fact, the winter of 1944-1945
was the coldest that Europe had experienced in fifty years.168 This battle, a final case
study for the combat capabilities of the Blue Ridge Division, argues that the men of the
80th had learned from their experiences, triumphs, and failures at the Battle of ArgentanFalise Gap and the crossing of the Moselle River to become an effective fighting force at
the Battle of the Bulge.
As the Battle of the Bulge was such a massive battle, with so many different
events taking place over the course of the engagement, it is impossible within the scope
of this thesis to examine the 80th’s involvement in the Ardennes Offensive in its entirety.
For this reason, the final chapter of this thesis will examine a selection of smaller
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confrontations within this battle. For the most part, these highlights, so to speak, focus on
the Blue Ridge Division’s involvement in the liberation and capture of relatively small
cities and towns in their area of responsibility. As it is one of the most important actions
of the Battle of the Bulge, the 80th’s actions at Bastogne, Belgium is also examined in this
chapter.
The Situation on the Front

Figure 9. The German Assault, December 1944169
The primary goal of Hitler’s winter offensive was the capture of Antwerp.170 The
Führer had come to the realization that he would be unable to achieve an exclusively
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military victory in the war. He hoped the Ardennes offensive would drive a wedge
between the United States and Great Britain.171 For the most part, American leadership
was caught off guard by the German thrust, surprising considering the fact that the
Germans had previously advanced through hthe Ardennes in 1940.172
Hitler knew that this assault must end with a decisive victory for Germany if it
was to bring about the peace negotiations he wanted. The German dictator chose to attack
on the Western Front rather than the Eastern or Italian Fronts for several reasons. In
regards to the Eastern Front, the Soviet forces were so large that a German assault would
not cause significant damage to the Russian war effort, and the one-party Soviet Union
was much less likely to cooperate in negotiations. Hitler also realized that attacking in
Italy did not make logical sense when considering strategic goals. Furthermore, the
mountains in Italy presented excellent defensive positions for the Allies. German high
command knew that an attack on the Western Front could bring about a greater impact on
the Allied war effort because their armies were not as large as those of the Soviets in the
East. Hitler and the Wehracht also wanted to protect the large German industrial
complexes in the western region of their country. Finally, as historian Danny S. Parker
argues, Hitler thought that attacking in the West would be the blow that would drive the
aforementioned wedge between the United States and their British allies.173
True to form as a tyrannical dictator, Hitler severely micromanaged the generals
of the Wehrmacht. Parker states that German high command, Oberkommando der
Wehrmacht (OKW), “was an uneasy mixture of obedient military planners and sycophant
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yes-men.” As such, they could not believe their ears, nor could they immediately voice
their misgivings, when Hitler stated his plan for an assault through the Ardennes with the
goal of capturing Antwerp.174 Although he ordered his generals to draw up several
possible plans of attack, the German leader ultimately decided upon combining two of
their proposed plans that were the embodiment of his original plan of taking Antwerp
through the Ardennes Forest. This operation was codenamed Watch on the Rhine (Wacht
am Rhein in German). Much like he had done during the Normandy invasion, Hitler
continued to believe he alone knew best how to carry out the war effort against the Allied
Powers.175
As previously mentioned, SHAEF and the US Army did not believe the German
assault would come through the Ardennes Forest.176 This was in no small part due to the
fact that the Germans were masterful in their deception operations leading up to Watch
on the Rhine. Wehrmacht leadership placed as little men as possible on the front lines in
the Ardennes in an effort to fool the Americans into believing an assault would come
from another location. American soldiers viewed an assignment to the region as a break
from fighting. German radio communication consistently broadcast false plans with the
hope that the Allies would take these transmissions as accurate intelligence. Hitler would
not allow talk of the actual operation over the radio. Therefore, all communication about
Watch on the Rhine occurred in person or through letters.177
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The Allies were so confident in their code breaking, under the codename ULTRA,
that they did not believe any intelligence they got through these channels could be
inaccurate. Although men like Major General Kenneht W. Strong, the personal
intelligence officer of General Dwight D. Eisenhower, saw signs of a German offensive
buildup near the Ardennes, other high-ranking generals, like Omar Bradley, brushed off
these assertions as they believed men such as Strong had become “the boy who cried
wolf.”178 Ultimately, Allied leadership attributed the German build-up to a counterattack
force that would be employed once the Allies pushed further into the European
continent.179
Once the painstaking process of planning was complete, Hitler and the
Wehrmacht were finally ready to begin their great assault against the United States Army.
German artillery began firing on Allied positions at 0530 on the morning of 16 December
1944, beginning what would become Nazi Germany’s last major offensive in the Second
World War.180 As the Führer had hoped, the attack achieved complete surprise on the
unsuspecting American troops.181 It ultimately fell on the shoulders of General
Eisenhower to determine how to stop the German advance and push the Wehrmacht back
into its former positions and beyond. He recognized that this was a chance to engage the
Germans when they were not occupying formidable defensive positions. Eisenhower’s
objective was to slow the German advance until the weather permitted the use of Allied
superiority in the air. American and British planes had been unable to carry out their
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missions due to poor weather conditions. His plan was to reinforce the American units
located on the northern and southern sides of the salient. Ike would rely on General
George S. Patton’s Third US Army to shore up defenses on the southern flank of the
bulge. Patton informed Eisenhower that he could attack on 22 December with three
divisions. Although the Supreme Allied Commander voiced his initial misgivings that
only three divisions would suffice for this operation, the eventually ordered Patton to
carry out his plan with the 4th Armored Division, the 26th Infantry Division, and the 80th
Blue Ridge Infantry Division. Thus began operations of one of the greatest victories in
the history of the United States Army.182
The Blue Ridgers Enter the Fray: Initial Confrontations and the Division’s Drive Toward
Bastogne
By the time of the German assault in the Ardennes Forest, the 80th Infantry
Division was no longer an inexperienced combat unit. It had proven that, while it was not
without fault, it could succeed on the battlefields of the European Theater of Operations.
The Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap and the crossing of the Moselle River tested their
mettle, but the men of the Blue Ridge Division had faced these challenges head on and
pushed onwards towards victory. When the Germans launched Operation Watch on the
Rhine, the Blue Ridgers were in corps reserve, having been relieved of front line combat
duties by the US Army’s 6th Armored Division. During this time, beginning on the 8th of
December, the division’s men recuperated, trained, and repaired damaged war
materiel.183
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While the Army’s confrontation with the Wehrmacht in the Huertgen Forest is not
discussed in detail in this thesis, Michael D. Doubler devotes a full chapter of his work
Closing With the Enemy to this engagement. Doubler shows that the Americans struggled
mightily in this battle, fighting tooth and nail and suffering heavy casualties.
Nevertheless, the GIs saw little reward for their blood, sweat, and tears. Closing With the
Enemy argues that the United States Army simply was not prepared to fight in a forested
environment when it found itself in the Huertgen Forest.184 The Blue Ridge Division
recognized this deficiency in American doctrine and devoted some of its training time to
ensuring they could fight effectively in a forest. Though they did not know at the time,
these new tactics would be of paramount importance in the coming German offensive in
the Ardennes. This again displays that the 80th Division, its officers, and its men learned
from their previous experiences in combat, and those of the rest of the United States
Army, to improve the combat effectiveness of the Blue Ridgers.
Showing that the division’s leadership understood the importance of learning
from previous battles and improving combat effectiveness from these lessons, the
operational history states that “an emphasis was placed on the training of assault teams in
the attack of fortified positions, anti-tank work, and anti-tank infantry coordination,
fighting in woods, and use of demolitions and range firing of small and automatic
weapons.”185 As shown in the chapter covering the Battle of Argentan, the 80th Infantry
Division struggled to properly coordinate operations between their armored and infantry
units. Therefore, the men commanding the division, such as General Horace McBride,
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saw the need for subsequent training in this area when the division was away from the
front lines and had time to devote to such activities.
Historian Peter R. Mansoor also shows that the 80th Division knew the importance
of training by using the testimony of a Battalion Commander of the Blue Ridge Division.
While this was not a problem unique to the 80th Division, it is nonetheless a member of
the 80th who stated:

The most important factor in improving the combat effectiveness of my unit was
training. For instance, it was not unusual to have a company reduced to a handful
of men during a particularly vicious attack or defense. That night the unit was
filled with replacements who came up in the dark, were placed into a foxhole in
the dark, never knew what their squad leader looked like, and did not know their
platoon or company commander…At every opportunity I put a different company
in reserve and then had it train until it was needed. The veterans were invaluable
in teaching the new replacements the vagaries of the battlefield and the new
replacements learned quickly or they became casualties.186

This quote from an unnamed officer in the Blue Ridge Division shows that the leadership
of the 80th had learned the importance of taking lessons learned during earlier battles and
applying them to subsequent engagements. While new replacements had been through
basic training, they did not have the experience of soldiers who had been on the front for
a longer period of time. Therefore, it fell upon veterans of the war to show the new
soldiers how to fight and survive in combat, thereby improving the combat effectiveness
of the 80th Infantry Division as a whole.
Prior to the creation of the bulge in the Ardennes Forest, the 80th Infantry Division
was preparing for an assault of the Siegfried Line. Also called the West Wall, this served
as the primary line of defense for the German border. However, historian Russell F.
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Weigley argues that this defensive structure, which took 500,000 workers to complete,
and still did not satisfy Hitler, was not meant to completely stop an enemy from crossing
the German border. Rather, its intent was to delay an enemy force to allow
reinforcements the time to arrive on the front. Because the West Wall was comprised of a
number of pillboxes, the Blue Ridgers realized they had to train to attack fortified
positions, which they had struggled to do at the Moselle River.187 Here again, the 80th
Infantry Division showed the ability to learn from its previous combat experiences.
Although they would not attack the Siegfried Line at this point in the war because of the
German Ardennes assault, the Blue Ridge Division nevertheless made significant strides
in improving its combat capabilities in the point in time immediately before the
Wehrmacht punched through the Allied lines in December 1944.
When the Germans began their attack on the 16th of December, the 80th was
ordered to help push back the Wehrmacht in the vicinity of the US First Army, thought it
was still under the command of the Third Army. They arrived at their assigned location
three days later on the 19th.188 The division’s specific orders were to defend and hold
Luxembourg City. According to Andrew Adkins, Jr., a veteran of the 80th, General
Patton’s orders were to “Hold to the last man” showing the great importance of the
capital city of the small European nation.189 US Army leadership did everything it could
to stop the momentum of the German advance. Therefore, the Battle of the Bugle was, at
least at the beginning of the engagement, a primarily defensive operation for the United
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States Army and the 80th Infantry Division. This was in stark contrast to the Battle of
Argentan and the crossing of the Moselle River, which saw the Army in an offensive
posture, pushing its German enemy further and further into the European continent.
Although the Blue Ridgers had experienced combat before, this would be a different
battle altogether and would test these men in much different ways.
When the division arrived at Luxembourg City, the 317th and 318th Infantry
Regiments were tasked with taking positions near the city while the 319th was placed in
division reserve. While the overall objective of the 80th was to prevent the Germans from
continuing their westward push through the area, this did involve some offensive actions
from the Blue Ridgers. The 318th Combat Team advanced towards the town of Ettelbruck
where it encountered enemy resistance. Included in this engagement was B Company of
the 702nd Tank Battalion, a platoon of light tanks from the 702nd, and one infantry
company from the 1st Battalion of the 318th, showing that the division had learned from
its previous battles by having its infantry and armored units operation in close
cooperation with one another. In this instance, the American GIs were actually riding on
the tanks towards their objective. At the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap, the division had
struggled initially to properly coordinate its infantry unit with its tanks and other armored
forces. However, when attacking Ettelbruck, without delay the Blue Ridgers placed their
foot soldiers in the immediate proximity of their tanks. When the 80th arrived at this
location, the Germans had no clue their adversaries had been on the move. It was not
until the Blue Ridge Division’s artillery began bombarding the Wehrmacht that they
realized there were Americans in the area. The Germans were so surprised by the arrival
of American forces that many simply turned and ran when they saw the advancing GIs.
89

However, many did stay behind and defend the town, with American units controlling
positions nearby the town by the end of 21 December. Ultimately, the Americans were
pushing towards Bastogne and continued their northward march.190
The division’s next task, one of the most famous and pivotal operations of the
Battle of the Bulge, would further test its abilities to learn from their previous combat
experiences. The Blue Ridgers, along with other units of General Patton’s forces, were
tasked with assisting in the liberation of Bastogne, Belgium and the 101st Airborne
“Screaming Eagle” Division.191 In fact, the attack on Ettelbruck was the first stage of the
division’s movement towards Bastogne. One veteran of the Blue Ridge Division stated,
“Every day seemed the same: miles of marching, intense cold, swirling fog, mysterious
and general confusion…We stumbled ten to fifteen miles each day with temperatures
dropping to twenty below zero.”192 For the foreseeable future, this would be the lot of the
division: trudging through the frozen terrain to reach its objectives. Making these
marches even more daunting was the fact that, by the time the division began operations
in Luxembourg, divisional logistical sections had some difficulty in supplying adequate
winter clothing. Not only did Blue Ridgers have to learn to fight in the cold weather.
They were also forced to learn how to adapt to the cold without proper clothing.193
Veteran Andrew Z. Adkins, III states that during one troop movement, “Our first
obstacle was a huge, steep mountain. It, too, was slick as glass and the men would have
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to muster superhuman strength to get to the top. But that was only the beginning of our
obstacle course. I wondered how long men could be driven like this. Would we ever get
relief?”194 While this excerpt comes from a later point in the Battle of the Bulge, the men
struggled with viciously cold weather throughout the battle. This also points towards the
improved willingness of the men of the 80th to press on in the face of hardship. While at
the Battle of Argentan, at least one officer of the division found himself resorting to
physical coercion to motivate his men to move forward, Adkins did not have this
problem.195 His soldiers, while certainly not ecstatic over the prospect of warfare,
nonetheless pushed forward, showing an improved ability to carry out their duties in the
face of danger.
The paratroopers of the 101st Airborne had been surrounded by the Germans in
Bastogne, Belgium. When the Wehrmacht asked for his surrender, Brigadier General
Anthony C. MacAuliffe, commander of the 101st, replied with one of the most wellknown quotes of the Second World War: “Nuts!”196 Eisenhower, understanding the dire
situation in which the Screaming Eagles found themselves, chose to send Patton’s Third
US Army to their rescue. In particular, the responsibility for this operation fell upon the
80th and 26th Infantry Divisions along with the 4th Armored Division.197
December 22nd saw the 319th Infantry Regiment make its first appearance in the
Battle of the Bulge. Again working in close proximity with elements of the 702nd Tank
Battalion, soldiers of the 3rd Battalion took the town of Michelbach, Germany within an
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hour of their arrival. Their next objective was Merzig, Germany. Tanks of the 702nd Tank
Battalion entered the town at 1040 on the morning of 22 December, and infantry
formations took up positions near the town at 1100 hours. Although the division faced
small arms fire and artillery from the Germans occupying the town, American forces took
control of the community by the end of the day. This is in stark contrast to the division’s
first battle at Argentan. Fighting tooth and nail, it took the 80th Infantry Division roughly
two days to take the small French town. However, only one battalion of the 319th Infantry
Regiment was able to take the much larger city of Merzig in only a few hours. Between
August 18th and the 22nd of December, the Blue Ridgers had significantly improved their
combat effectiveness, as evidenced by the relative ease with which they took control of
Merzig. While the operational history does not make specific mention of the use of
artillery in this instance, the proper coordination of tanks and foot soldiers from the onset
of hostilities is a telling factor in this significant improvement in fighting capabilities.198
One factor which could have contributed to the division taking Mertzig so quickly
was that the Germans were not occupying defensive positions when the Blue Ridgers
launched their attack. Prisoners of war reported that the Wehrmacht soldiers’ orders were
to attack American positions, and the Germans were without cover and concealment
when the 80th assaulted the town.199 Although the German soldiers were not preparing to
stave off a concerted offensive effort from the 80th Infantry Division, this does not
significantly detract from the fact that the Blue Ridgers showed in this instance that they
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had improved their fighting capabilities. That there was much more coordination of
infantry and armor from the onset of battle is evidence of this.
The 80th, and specifically the 319th Infantry Regiment, also showed their ability to
effectively employ its artillery fire at Mertzig. When the German 352nd Volksgrenadier
Division began a counterattack in an effort to retake Mertzig, the 905th Field Artillery
Battalion fired upon the enemy to prevent the Wehrmacht from advancing any further.200
In addition, the 905th was in direct support of the 319th as it advanced further and further
into German held areas.201 By ensuring continued cooperation with artillery units like the
905th, the Blue Ridge Division showed it had improved its combat effectiveness over the
course of the war in Europe, as evidenced by the fact that this artillery barrage played a
significant, if not decisive, role in halting the German counterattack. Although US Army
artillery doctrine was of a higher quality than that of armored units during the war, the
fact that the division continued to use it in an effective way shows the Blue Ridgers
learned from their previous experiences that artillery support was crucial to success on
the battlefield. Therefore, they resumed the use of Howitzers at the Battle of the Bulge. 202
The following day, Combat Team 319 continued its march toward German lines,
taking the towns of Oberfuelen, Fuelen, and Niederfuelen. As a whole, the division
captured Heiderscheid, Luxembourg by December 23rd. Again, this shows that the Blue
Ridge Division had substantially improved its combat capabilities by the time of the
Battle of the Bulge. Much like the 319th was able to take a town within a day working
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alone, the entire division was able to control Heiderscheid with relative ease. When
compared to the engagement at Argentan, the division 80th was much more efficient.
When the Germans attempted a counterattack, at Heiderscheid, the men of the 80th
successfully fended off their adversaries, knocking out all but five of the seventeen tanks
they faced.203
On Christmas Eve 1944, the division devoted two battalions as reinforcements for
the 4th Armored Division in its final drive towards Bastogne and the encircled 101st
Airborne. The Operational history of the division states, “This diminution in its rifle
strength and successive collisions with German units crossing the front enroute to the
Bastogne sector constituted the closest link the 80th Division would have with the
dramatic effort being made to reach the encircled 101st Airborne.”204 While only part of
the Blue Ridge Division was so closely involved in the liberation of the Screaming
Eagles, the fact that they worked so closely with an armored division displays the
improvements in the implementation of combined arms warfare for the division by the
time of the Battle of the Bugle.
The 80th and 26th Infantry Divisions were tasked with clearing enemy resistance
east of the 4th Armored Division on its drive towards Bastogne. Although the Blue
Ridgers faced significant opposition from German soldiers and difficult terrain, the
division was able to reach the Sauer River by December 26th. It was on the same day that
the 4th Armored Division reached Bastogne and the encircled 101st Airborne.205
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The two battalions that were attached to the 4th Armored Division were the 1st and
2nd Battalions of the 318th Regiment. In addition, the Regimental Headquarters Company
was involved in the operation to liberate Bastogne. When the 4th Armored was able to
reach the city itself, but unable to return to other American units, the 2nd Battalion of the
318th launched a mission to provide further support to the armored division. The battalion
set out for Bastogne itself on 28 December and came into contact with elements of the
15th Panzer Grenadier Division.206 In his memoir, veteran Martin F. Loughlin remembers,
“Many did not come back from Bastogne. The 1st and 2nd Battalions later received a
Presidential Unit Citation for their heroism at Bastogne.”207 The fact that these battalions
were commended for their work through an official unit decoration is testament to the
fact that they were effective at Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. Though
casualties were high, they were able to assist the 4th Armored Division in relieving the
encircled 101st Airborne Division.
In addition to its actions at Bastogne, these two battalions of the 318th Regiment,
as well as the third, which was not directly involved in liberating the Screaming Eagle
Division, captured over 800 German POWs at Ettelbruck between the 25th and 28th of
December 1944.208 Acting in conjunction with the 4th Armored Division in this operation,
the Blue Ridgers were extremely effective in this instance. This is a testament to the fact
that the 80th Division had learned the great importance of the close coordination of
infantry and armor units truly was. While it is possible that the infantrymen could have
captured enemy soldiers and taken the town of Ettlebruck without the help of the armored
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vehicles of the 4th Armored Division, the process was much quicker and more efficient
when the two branches of combined arms worked together.
The Coordination of Infantry and Artillery
Many soldiers remember that enduring an artillery barrage as one of the most difficult
challenges of their war experiences. Though he did not fight in the European Theater, EB
Sledge writes in his memoir,

To be under a barrage of prolonged shelling simply magnified all the terrible
physical and emotional effects of one shell. To me, artillery was an invention of
hell. The onrushing whistle and scream of the big steel package of destruction was
the pinnacle of violent fury and the embodiment of pent-up evil. It was the
essence of violence and of man’s inhumanity to man. I developed a passionate
hatred for shells. To be killed by a bullet seemed so clean and surgical. But shells
would not only tear and rip the body, they tortured one’s mind almost beyond the
brink of sanity. After each shell I was wrung out, limp and exhausted.209

In addition to the physical problems presented by artillery fire, soldiers on both sides had
to contend with the psychological burden of a barrage. This only adds to the importance
of the coordination of infantry and artillery. During the Battle of the Bulge, the 80th
Infantry Division showed it had learned from previous combat experiences to improve
the way in which it coordinated the operations of infantry and artillery units.
On 30 December 1944, elements of the 319th Infantry Regiment encountered
German soldiers who were in the process of launching an attack against the Blue Ridgers.
The unit history for this month states, “Approximately 160 enemy moved against E
Company’s position and were stopped cold by artillery, mortar, and small arms fire. The
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enemy retreated with heavy casualties…No further enemy action that day.”210 In this
case, the presence of supporting artillery fire was telling in the ability of these individuals
of the 80th Division to repel the German attack on their positions. Furthermore, the
Americans were able to do much more than simply defend themselves. The Wehrmacht
forces suffered heavy casualties, as shown in the 319th Regiment’s unit history for
December, a testament to the fighting abilities of the division in this particular skirmish.
Had the artillery component of the 80th been unable to offer its support, the German
soldiers may have exacted a much heavier toll upon the Blue Ridgers.
A combat history for B Company of the 702nd Tank Battalion points towards a
day during the Battle of the Bulge in which American artillery was particularly effective:
“Last night our artillery gave the Germans no rest. Round after round was fired along
with Time on Target. It’s no wonder the Germans say we have automatic artillery.”211 At
this point in the Second World War, artillery elements of the Blue Ridge Division had
been in combat for roughly five months. As this example shows, as well as testament of
German soldiers, the division’s artillerymen had become, if not experts, highly proficient
in their combat roles. For officers and enlisted men of units like the 313th, 314th, and 905th
Field Artillery Battalions, pounding German positions with shells had become second
nature to them. So much so, in fact, that the Germans were in awe of the speed and
consistency with which they were receiving incoming fire. Not only would this wreak
physical damage upon German lines, Wehrmacht soldiers would have experienced
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psychological damage similar to the kind mentioned by EB Sledge. The Blue Ridgers had
become highly effective in both components of artillery warfare by the Battle of the
Bugle.
Learning from past experiences sometimes involves a military force knowing
when not to use a certain tactic or weapon. For instance, on 21 January 1945 elements of
the 80th Division were ordered to attack German soldiers located in the town of
Bourschied, Luxembourg. Veteran AZ Adkins, Jr. writes, “We had already seen part of
the terrain we would have to cross over during the attack. It was the roughest yet: rugged
hill covered with trees and piled with snow banks…Because of the nature of the terrain,
we knew that artillery would be of little or no use to us.”212 The officers of the division
understood that it would be a waste of time, energy, and resources to attempt to use
artillery fire in this particular assault. They had learned from the Battle of ArgentanFalaise Gap, the crossing of the Moselle River, and presumably, other conflicts in which
they were involved, that they would do better to refrain from firing artillery shells at the
Germans. To attempt to do so would have been the antithesis of improving combat
effectiveness through lessons learned.
Joe Carrasco, a veteran of E Company of the 318th Infantry Regiment recalls a
time in which artillery fire was crucially important for him and the other men of his unit:
“As we moved from town to town, city to city, we became surrounded. An artillery
officer told us all to gather in one room of the house. He then called in the artillery
coordinates. The shells started hitting the roof of the house and the Germans took off. It
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felt pretty weird being shelled by our own artillery.”213 The forward observer attached to
Carrasco’s unit was so confident in the ability of the gunners manning the artillery pieces
that he was willing to call in an artillery strike on the building in which he was located.
Presumably, this is not something an individual would have been comfortable doing at
earlier points in the war. By the Battle of the Bulge, he understood how effective his
artillerymen were, and trusted them to do exactly as he asked. Examples such as this
show that artillerymen and infantrymen of the Blue Ridge Division worked together
extremely well and were able to offer each other necessary support on the battlefields of
the European Theater.
The 28th of December saw the 1st Battalion of the 319th Infantry Regiment
experienced a significant assault from German soldiers. The unit history reads,
At 1440 the 1st Bn. received counterattack against Company B’s position. The
strength of the attack was estimated between 150 and 200 infantry. 1st Bn. placed
devastating machine gun, mortar, and artillery on the enemy…1st Bn.
counterattacked and drove enemy from the high ground inflicting numerous
casualties on the enemy. At no time did the 1st Bn. lose any ground to the
enemy.214

The powerful combination of machine guns, mortars, and artillery pieces played a
significant role in the battalion’s ability to fend off the German advance. At this point, the
veteran 80th Infantry Division understood how such massed firepower could decimate an
enemy force, and made sure to send as much ordnance toward their enemies as possible.
It is telling that the Germans, who were unable to force the battalion back any distance at
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all, consisted of only infantry units. Their inability to properly used massed firepower
was their downfall in this assault.
The Coordination of Infantry and Armor
Much like the challenges presented by the crossing of the Moselle River, the
Ardennes Forest was not well suited for tank warfare. Tanks and tank destroyers were
forced to navigate confined spaces and frozen terrain, both of which made it difficult for
the fighting of modern mechanized warfare with large armored vehicles.215 Historian
Danny S. Parker states that, “For this reason, as well as limitations that weather brought
to armor, the Ardennes Offensive was primarily resolved as an infantry battle.”216 This is
not to say, however, that armored units of the United States Army and the 80th Infantry
Division did not play a part in turning back the German assault that winter. As described
previously in this chapter, and as will continue to be displayed, tankers had an important
role in the Battle of the Bulge.
By this point in the Second World War, the Blue Ridge Division had significantly
improved their ability to coordinate the operations of foot soldiers and tanks/tank
destroyers. A sizeable portion of the Battle of the Bulge resembled the Battle of
Argentan-Falaise Gap in that the main objectives were small cities or towns on the
battlefield. For this reason, the 80th Division understood the best way to use its tanks in
coordination with infantry units during these types of conflicts during the battle.
During the previously mentioned attack on Bourschied, Luxembourg which took
place on the 21st of January, 80th Division officers realized they would still be able to use
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their tanks and tank destroyers in the assault even though they could not make use of their
artillery capabilities. This example shows that Blue Ridger leadership continued to make
use of their armored units as best they could. Veteran Andrew Adkins’s unit’s job was to
cross over and take control of a stretch of terrain which was inaccessible to tanks. Here
the Blue Ridge Division showed it fully understood the importance of tankers and
infantrymen working in close proximity to support one another and complete tasks that
the other could not do alone.217 While these two branches of combined arms previously
struggled to understand the abilities of the other, these units now knew how to work well
together to complete tasks to truly support their comrades.218 This understanding can only
come from experience in combat, trial and error, and learning from both failures and
successes on the battlefield.
One factor that led to the success of the infantry-armor team at the Battle of the
Bulge was the way in which anti-tank units were attached to infantry units. C. Robert
Harmon, a veteran of the 319th Regiment’s anti-tank company recalls, “The Antitank
Company was broken up just before the ‘Bulge’ and most of the men went to the line
companies.”219 It was important that anti-tank and armored units were not independent of
infantrymen on the battlefield. The most effective way to use armored units in this case
was as support for foot soldiers. The US Army had learned this lesson early in the war,
and the 80th took note.220 From the beginning of the Battle of the Bulge, leadership of the
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Blue Ridge Division understood this concept and made certain that their armored and
anti-tank units were dispersed among the rifle companies on the front to offer their direct
support.
The recollections of Gene N. Barry of the 319th Infantry Regiment provide
another example of the importance of combined arms warfare.

The house and barn were taking a lot of hits. Another man leaped to his feet,
shouting, ‘I’m getting out of here!” My Sgt. threw him to the floor. Saying,
‘You’re not going anywhere!’ I thought this was like a scene out of All Quiet on
the Western Front, where a man went mad from the shellfire and ran out of the
dugout to be killed. It would have been certain suicide for anyone to go outside.
When the shelling finally stopped, the German infantry was very close to us. We
heard a German burp gun firing. A Tank Destroyer, which was parked close by,
answered the shots with bursts from his .50 caliber machine gun. The attack was
beaten back and the noise abated.221

This example points towards the importance of artillery fire as well as armored
operations in support of infantry units. In this case, however, the Blue Ridgers were on
the receiving end of artillery shells. The psychological toll it took on the Americans, as
well as the fact that it allowed the Germans to move so close to Barry’s unit’s position,
shows the effectiveness of sufficient artillery fire. Furthermore, it was ultimately the
presence of the American tank destroyer which was the determining factor in this
skirmish. Once it opened fire on German soldiers, they were forced to retreat, saving the
beleaguered Americans trapped in the barn. The close proximity of this armored vehicle
further shows that the Blue Ridgers had learned how to make the best use of their
armored capabilities.
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On the 19th of January two platoons of the 702nd Tank Battalion were ordered to
assault and capture the town of Burden, Luxembourg. The attack would take place on the
20th, and the tanks were initially to attack without the benefit of infantry support.
However, the unit history states that on the day of the attack, the tanks had support from
the 318th Infantry Regiment. Entering the town at 1620 hours, the tanks and infantrymen
were able to take the town within three hours. While early plans for this attack did
indicate the tanks would act alone, officers of these units clearly thought better of this
decision and added infantry support. This resulted in a much more effective task force
which captured Burden with relative ease. Blue Ridge leadership had experienced enough
combat in the European Theater to know their armor would be badly exposed without the
318th to offer its assistance.222
The time period between their first engagement at Argentan, and one of their most
important at the Battle of the Bulge, the 80th Infantry Division significantly improved its
ability to coordinate the use of tanks, tank destroyers, and infantry units. Rather than
using their tanks as independent units, the Blue Ridgers had learned that their heavy
weaponry was most effective when working in close proximity to foot soldiers. By the
time the Germans launched their assault in the Ardennes in December 1945, the 80th
Division had grown much more accustomed to combat and the employment of armored
units.
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Assessing Overall Performance
At the beginning of the month of December, the 80th Infantry Division’s strength
numbered 703 officers, 41 warrant officers, and 12,103 enlisted men for a total of 12,847
men. During this month, which included a significant portion of the Battle of the Bulge,
1,328 were wounded in action, 140 went missing on the battlefield, and 344 men gave
their lives for their country. In all, 1,714 Blue Ridgers became casualties of warfare in the
month of December, many of which came during the Battle of the Bulge. This means the
division suffered a casualty rate of 13.3% during the month.223
The strength of the division at the beginning of January 1945 was 664 officers, 41
warrant officers, and 13,050 enlisted soldiers, totaling 13,755 Americans. Casualties for
this month were 1,782 wounded and 85 missing. 239 Blue Ridgers gave the ultimate
sacrifice. In all, there were 2,024 casualties in January 1945, calculating to a casualty rate
of 14.7%.224
While casualty numbers must continue to be examined in context, especially since
these have been calculated for the entire month rather than just those casualties within the
individual battle itself, these figures are striking. While the casualties for December and
January are significantly higher than those of August, they are only half of the casualty
rate for September 1944. Considering the sheer scale of the Battle of the Bugle, logic
would lead researchers to believe casualty rates would be higher. However, the opposite
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is true of this engagement. While the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap has much lower
numbers, the fact that it was a battle fought on a much smaller scale than the Bulge can
explain this. However, the crossing of the Moselle River was also smaller in scope than
the Battle of the Bugle. This significant decrease in casualty rates despite a much larger
engagement on the battlefield is strong evidence for an improvement in the fighting
capabilities of the 80th Infantry Division.225
Conclusion
The Battle of the Bulge was one of the largest battles in the European Theater of
Operations. In excess of one million soldiers were involved in this massive battle in the
winter of 1944-1945. In the midst of the German assault in the Ardennes Forest, the
Allied nations found themselves in a state of great confusion and chaos. Facing one of the
great crises of the war in Europe, the 80th Infantry Division was forced to take the lessons
it learned from its previous combat experiences at the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap and
the crossing of the Moselle River.226 While some of these examples of combined arms
warfare come from points in the Battle of the Bulge after the two case studies of events
during the battle, they nonetheless show the improved capabilities of the Blue Ridge
Division.
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During this battle, the Blue Ridgers displayed they did in fact have the ability to
learn from their previous experiences. The efficiency with which the division captured its
objectives, especially European cities and towns, is the most powerful testament to its
improved combat effectiveness. This was in large part due to the fact that the men of the
80th closely coordinated their infantry, armored, and artillery units from the onset of
battle. By contrast, officers of the 80th did not properly employ the concept of combined
arms in their previous engagements. In addition to these explanations for the Blue
Ridgers’ improved fighting capabilities, there is the factor of the division learning from
the combat experiences of other combat units in the United States Army. Historian
Michael Doubler argues that the Army as a whole was not at all prepared to fight in a
forest environment, as evidenced by the debacle that occurred in the Huertgen Forest.227
Because the 80th Infantry Division saw the need to understand how effectively to fight in
a forest, it devoted some of its training time to learning such tactics.228 This training was
crucial in making the division as effective and efficient as they could possibly be during
the Battle of the Bulge.
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CHAPTER V – EPILOGUE

Figure 10. Cecil Brannon in Training229
On the 27th of January 1945, Private Cecil Wilson Brannon of the 318th Infantry
Regiment (previously of the 319th) wrote a letter to his brother, JA “Jay” Brannon to tell
him he was well.230 This was a relative term as Private Brannon had suffered a wound to
his left leg on 2 December 1944 while he was still a member of the 319th Regiment.231 He
would carry shrapnel in his leg until his death in 1989. Brannon was with the Blue Ridge
Division from the time it arrived in Europe on the RMS Queen Mary until the end of the
war.
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The Brannon Heritage, 41.
Cecil W. Brannon Letter to JA Brannon, January 27, 1945, The Brannon Heritage, 66.
231
Unit History for Month of Decembe-319th Infantry Regiment, Unit Histories, 80th Infantry
Division Digital Archives Project, (80th DDAP), 16,
http://www.80thdivision.com/UnitHistories/319thInfReg_UnitHistory_DEC44.pdf.
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Not surprisingly, he did not like to talk about the war. However, the experiences
of his time in Europe did stay with him for the rest of his life. More than just the physical
damage of the shrapnel in his leg, Brannon, like so many other veterans, bore
psychological scars from the war. When on a city bus in Greenville, South Carolina, he
suffered a flashback when there was an explosion at a nearby laundromat. Brannon fell to
the floor, a knee jerk reaction after his time in the war. Near the end of his life, he
suffered another flashback in a hospital. His daughter, Linda Price, stated he was lying in
his bed screaming about incoming fire and the location of German soldiers.
Though he did not share much of his war experience, Cecil Brannon did mention
how he loathed patrolling through abandoned communities. Though he was primarily a
truck driver for the Army during the war, there were times when he was required to carry
a rifle and fight with other infantrymen. Seeing the pictures of families who had been
forced to flee their homes struck a chord with the young American soldier. Though his
age of 27 years might have been significantly older than many soldiers, he was
nonetheless a man in the early stages of life, and seeing these pictures forced him to
ponder the fact that these families were suffering when it could have so easily been his
own family in the crosshairs of the war. The level of human suffering which he witnessed
caused him to give up hunting after the war ended.232
Cecil Brannon was one of thousands of members of the 80th Infantry Division
who endured the most destructive war in human history. From their first major
confrontation with German forces at Argentan, to the crossing of the Moselle River, the

232

The Brannon Heritage, 4; The details of the life of Cecil Brannon listed here have been passed
down in the Brannon and Price Families since his death in 1989. They are the combination of stories I have
heard from my father, my paternal grandparents, and my paternal grandmother’s siblings.

108

Battle of the Bulge, and beyond, the Blue Ridgers faced significant challenges in the
European Theater of Operations. As is to be expected of a military force encountering its
first real combat experience, the division was not at peak fighting performance at the
Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap. While they did ultimately achieve their objectives, it was
not with the efficiency higher command, or the members of the 80th itself would have
preferred.
While logic may indicate that a combat division would improve its fighting
capabilities along a linear trajectory throughout warfare, this was not necessarily the case
with the Blue Ridge Division. At the crossing of the Moselle River, the 80th failed
properly to coordinate the branches of combined arms, especially in regards to infantry
and artillery fire. Again, the Blue Ridgers ultimately achieved their objectives. It was at
the Battle of the Bulge that the division truly became a well-oiled machine, as it were, on
the battlefield. Because the 80th found time to devote to training while they were in
divisional reserve, the soldiers and officers of the unit learned how to best fight this new
modern war which the United States Army had never before experienced. The Blue
Ridgers captured their objectives with much greater efficiency as they pressed on towards
their major objectives like Bastogne.
The fact that the division was able to improve its fighting capabilities over the
course of the war, and used periods of non combat to train in order to do so, supports the
arguments of Michael D. Doubler and Peter R. Mansoor. These authors argue that the
United States Army was not equal to the Germans at the onset of war, but that American
soldiers learned how to fight in this new type of combat as the conflict progressed. By the
end of hostilities, they state the US Army had greatly improved its combat effectiveness
109

through lessons learned from its past and improvements in training and other Army
operations.233
It was the ability of the division to learn from its previous experiences and change
the way it fought which ultimately allowed it to succeed against the German Wehrmacht
in the European Theater of Operations. From the Battle of Argentan-Falaise Gap, to
crossing the Moselle River, and the division’s largest engagement at the Battle of the
Bulge, the Blue Ridgers improved their fighting capabilities and combat effectiveness.
However, this was not necessarily done in a liner fashion. Ultimately, however, the men
of the 80th Division did master the concept of combined arms warfare in the Second
World War and pushed onwards towards victory over the forces of tyranny in Europe.
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APPENDIX A
80th Infantry Division Order of Battle234
317th Infantry Regiment
318th Infantry Regiment
319th Infantry Regiment
313th Field Artillery Battalion
314th Field Artillery Battalion
315th Field Artillery Battalion
905th Field Artillery Battalion
80th Reconnaissance Troops, Mechanized
702nd Tank Battalion (Various Attachments)
610th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Various Attachments)
691st Tank Destroyer Battalion (Temporary Attachment)
802nd Tank Destroyer Battalion (Temporary Attachment)
808th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Temporary Attachment)
811th Tank Destroyer Battalion (Temporary Attachment)
633rd Anti Aircraft Artillery Automatic Weapons Battalion (Temporary
Attachment)
305th Engineer Combat Battalion
305th Medical Battalion
80th Counter Intelligence Corps Detachment
Headquarters Special Forces
Headquarters Company, 80th Infantry Division
Military Police Platoon
780th Ordnance Light Maintenance Company
80th Quartermaster Company
80th Signal Company
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